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the jury at trial of this case. Such matters are not properly 
part of the record on appeal and will not be considered by this 
Court when reviewing the merits of the appeal." A complete copy 
of this order is attached for reference as Addendum I. For what-
ever assistance it might be to the Court, respondent has attached 
as Addendum II a copy of Appellant's Brief with the intemperate 
statements and references to matters not in the record below de-
leted by shadowing. Also, it should be noted that the exhibit 
numbers referred to in Appellants Brief are exhibits to his brief 
and are not the exhibit numbers of exhibits in this action. Most 
of the brief exhibits are not of record in this action and are 
subject to the Court's order of June 11, 1986. 
From an examination of Appellant's Brief as modified by the 
Court's order of June 11, 1986, respondent perceives the issues 
raised by defendant on appeal to be: 
1. Was defendant denied any rights under the Fifth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution or Article I, Section 7 of the 
Utah Constitution by the trial court's rulings on discovery issues 
which prevented defendant from having a fair trial? 
2. Was defendant denied any rights under the First Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 15 of 
the Utah Constitution in the trial court's ruling that the defam-
atory statements constituted libel per se if found to be false? 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying de-
fendant's motion for a change of venue? (Although mentioned in 
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the brief, defendant did not designate this issue as a point on 
appeal). 
4. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error in advising 
the jury of the nature of the case it was about to try? 
5. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error in its evi-
dentiary ruling at trial? (Although mentioned in his brief, de* 
fendant did not designate this issue as a point on appeal). 
6. Did the trial court violate defendant's priest-penitent 
privilege? 
7. Does the record establish that plaintiff gave perjured 
testimony at trial? 
These issues will be treated in approximately the same order 
as raised in Appellant's Brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The purported Statement of Facts in Appellant's Brief fails 
to set forth many material facts, and is filled with statements 
unsupported by the record in this case, most of which involve 
other actions. Plaintiff, therefore, deems it necessary to re-
state the facts. The parties are identified as they appeared 
below. 
A. Regarding the Book. 
Defendant wrote and published a book entitled ONE AGAINST 
THE STORM (Ex. 23-P), hereinafter the "Book,11 and a letter to 
President Ezra Taft Benson, then an Apostle and now President 
of the LDS Church (Ex. 35-P), hereinafter the "Letter," which 
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contained untrue, defamatory statements about plaintiff in his 
professional capacity as an attorney at law and, therefore, were 
libelous per se. The Book contained eleven statements which plain-
tiff alleged were libelous per se for the reasons set forth in 
the Revised Amended Complaint (R.155-168), as noted below: 
(a) On page 12, defendant states that the plaintiff com-
mitted barratry and champerty in the following language: 
lfI fully believed that Mark would let 
the matter drop. He would have, too, if only 
both of his brothers-in-law, Wayne Wadsworth 
and David Young, had not advised him. They 
thought there was a good chance that if he 
gained custody of the boy, he could still 
get control of the trust money." (R.160). 
(b) On page 42, defendant states that the plaintiff bribed 
a prospective witness, Dr. Robert H. Marshall, for the apparent 
purpose of giving false testimony, at his deposition in the fol-
lowing language: 
"The hearing brought out a number of 
facts that appalled me. First, it seemed 
that Sylvi and Wadsworth (her brother-in-law, 
remember), had 'bought' the testimony of an 
incompetent doctor whose words simply aped 
Sylvi's and Mark's opinions. . . . " (R.160). 
(c) On page 43, defendant states that the plaintiff mis-
directed the court in the following language: 
" . . . But what hurt most was Wheelers 
and Wadsworth's attempts to misdirect the 
Court. And, unfortunately for David, they 
succeeded. . . ." (R.160). 
(d) On page 160, defendant states that the plaintiff em-
ployed improper legal tactics, characterized as "dirty tricks" 
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in the following language: 
"I was the victim of both lies and innu-
endos. I shouldn't have been surprised at 
Wadsworth1s doing these things. He had good 
training; he was a former F.B.I, man, and 
I knew from recent disclosures th$t F.B.I. 
men were well-trained in dirty tricks." (R.161). 
(e) On page 163, defendant states that plaintiff lied to 
the court during the January 1979 hearing, in the following lan-
guage: 
lfMr. Wadsworth made patentlyl false and 
libelous statements about me personally, un-
founded accusations he knew nothing about, 
i» 
lfThe hearing was held on January 12. 
Wadsworth, stood and made blatant statements 
- lies - . . ." (R.161). 
(f) On page 178, defendant states thdt the plaintiff com-
mitted perjury and violated his oath as an attorney during the 
deposition of Mark Wheeler, in the following language: 
"During the day, even while giving his 
deposition, he [Mark Wheeler] repeatedly per-
jured himself. Wadsworth fell into the same 
pattern, completely violating the oath which 
he took upon becoming an attorney." (R.161). 
(g) On page 179, defendant states that the plaintiff lied, 
attempted to mislead the court, and otherwise violated his oath 
as an attorney, in the following language: 
"Throughout this whole legal mess, Wads-
worth repeatedly lied, slandered and attempted 
to mislead the judge through tactics which 
clearly violated his oath as an attorney." 
(R.161-2). 
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(h) On pages 183-4, defendant states that the plaintiff 
as an attorney improperly instigated legal proceedings and com-
mitted perjury in an attempt to illegally obtain Joan Wheeler's 
money for his own personal gain, in the following language: 
"After hearing parts of the will, he 
[Mark Wheeler] seemed to have all the wind 
taken out of his sails. I believe the whole 
matter would have been dropped right then 
and there, had it not been for Wadsworth and 
Dave Young. There is no doubt in my mind 
that they incited Mark to action by telling 
him that in all probability he could gain 
custody of David, and if he did, there might 
be some legal technicality they could maneuver 
to subvert Joan's last will and testament, 
to break the trust and get their hands on 
her money.fl 
" . . . And Wadsworth - well, I found 
Wadsworth to be a classic example of arrogance, 
sanctimony, and crudity. He was capable of 
anything for personal gain. His lies, per-
juries and misrepresentations in this area 
clearly characterize his character." 
"Despite their obvious record, both of 
these men parade around, piously proclaiming 
themselves to be practicing Christians. . . . 
I sometimes think that it is no accident -
at least in Utah - the words 'lawyer' and 
'liar' sound alike." 
ic -k ic -k 
". . . Obviously this was a bit of legal 
dealery. Wadsworth plotted to blame me in 
order to defame my character. He thought 
this would help them get their hands on the 
money, . . ." (R.162-3). 
(i) On page 185, defendant states that the plaintiff lied 
to opposing counsel and the court during the custody action in 
the following language: 
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f,Wadsworth repeatedly lied and contra-
dicted himself in letters and documents to 
both Paul Liapis and the Court as well as 
at the hearing in front of a judge." (R.163). 
(j) On page 201, defendant accuses the plaintiff of par-
ticipating in an alteration of the transcript of the July 23, 
1979 trial in the custody action (although admittedly having been 
told by the court reporter that he had not)|, in the following 
language: 
". . . Aware of other tactics Wadsworth 
and Young had used as officers of the law, 
I determined to go down to the courthouse 
and check the transcript myself . . . .If 
". . . The $1,000.00 had been written 
on top of correction fluid! At the top of 
the 'l1 there was a slight curve resembling 
the top of the figure f3f - obviously omitted 
from the fluid. I was convinced that the 
original figure had read 3,000.00 and Mr. 
Lewis1 [the court reporter] behavior simply 
confirmed my opinion that either Wadsworth 
or Young had taken it upon themselves to have 
the figure changed.11 
". . . When I observed the actions of 
these two attorneys, I find it impossible 
to believe that all these things happened 
merely by chance. . . . " (R.163-4). 
(k) On pages 205-6, defendants infer that the plaintiff 
lied to the court during a hearing in the tort action when he 
represented to the court that Mark Wheeler was employed by Touche 
Ross, in the following language: 
"Wadsworth had everything planned. He 
presented Judge Winder with a letter from 
Mark with the instructions that ,the letter 
was for the judge's eyes only. . . . " 
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"After reading the letter, Judge Winder 
asked, fis this Mr. Wheeler an accountant 
for Touche Ross?1 Wadsworth, after a hesita-
tion and a bit of stammering said, 'well, 
no, Your Honor. He is sort of . . . a . . . 
ah ah . . .in business . . . ah . . . manage-
ment.1 He was visibly shaken. He hadn't 
expected the judge to mention Touche Ross. 
Wadsworth1s stammering made me doubt the au-
thenticity of that letter. . . .,f 
"Back at my office, I called my attorney 
in California and asked him to check with 
Touche Ross. In less than one hour he called 
back to report that Touche Ross said Mark's 
employment with them ended in 1976 and he 
had not worked for them since.ff (R.164). 
The Letter contained the following language accusing the 
plaintiff of perjury: 
"In a deposition, Wayne Wadsworth, at-
torney for the Wheeler's (and also their Broth-
er-in-law) stated it was He and David Young 
who went to see Elder Hanks on May 22nd and 
the subject of attempted murder was never 
discussed. . . . I called Bishop Heinz out 
of the meeting to tell him of the obvious 
perjury on the part of Wayne Wadsworth." 
(R.165, Ex.35-P). 
At the commencement of trial, defendant moved the court to 
strike certain allegations of libel regarding the Book on the 
ground that they were mere opinions, or subject to more than one 
interpretation (R.500-512). The court struck plaintiff's allega-
tion regarding statement (a) holding that it was not libelous 
(R.517), but held in effect that statements (b) regarding bribing 
a witness, (c) regarding misleading the court, (d) regarding dirt 
tricks, (e) regarding perjury, (f) regarding perjury, (g) regardi 
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lying and misleading the Court, (h) regarding perjury and misrep-
resentation, (i) regarding lying to a judge, and (k) regarding 
I 
altering an official court record were libelous per se as to an 
attorney and would remain in the action (R.518-20). 
In addition to the specific defamatoryistatements made re-
garding plaintiff, the Book contains many general accusations 
against the legal profession. The Book on its back cover states: 
MThe facade of respectibility of professional 
people - legal, judicial, political and reli-
gious - BARED." 
"Her death brought such bizarre a^ id incredible 
circumstances as to bogle [sic] the human 
mind. This could happen to anyone." 
"They were victims of legal brutality and 
chauvinistic judges." 
The Author's Note contains the following statements: 
"ONE AGAINST THE STORM is true. The people 
are real, their names unchanged. The docu-
mented incidents are examples of love, hate, 
greed, betrayal, discrimination, revenge that 
extends beyond the grave, legal chicanery, 
brutality, and perjury, judicial incompetence 
and dishonesty." 
* * * 
"The professional people involved in this 
story are recognized in legal, judicial, po-
litical and religious circles; nonetheless, 
they have lied, perjured, and subverted jus-
tice for personal gain. . . . " 
* * * 
"While many have realized that the account 
must be told, I am totally and exclusively 
responsible for the telling. No one, except 
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me, is responsible for deciding to publish 
the volumes, and to reveal the astonishing 
and squalid details of a system of fjustice! 
that makes a mockery of our present society. 
Stanley C. Mann" 
At pages 181-2 it states: 
"Other states are moving to correct the 
injustices which have been forced upon cit-
izens by the legal profession in ever-increasing 
numbers. Utah is lagging far behind. Why 
are reputable members of the profession pro-
tecting the likes of a conspiring Wadsworth 
and Young? . . . Whatever the reason, because 
of their greed in achieving the accoutrements 
of success (money, prestige, etc), most of 
them seem to lack the backbone and character 
to take a stand in correcting obvious injus-
tices perpetrated upon people. 
And at page 184, referring to Mormon attorneys, states: 
"Does their conscience allow them to openly 
lie, or do they hide behind the rhetorical 
answer: 'Yes, I am honest within the context 
of my profession.' (I have been advised by 
several of these spiritual leaders that more 
and more lawyers are responding in just this 
manner. But even this can in no way justify 
their unethical or immoral behavior. I some-
times think it is no accident that - at least 
in Utah - the words 'lawyer' and 'liar1 sound 
alike.)" 
Further, at page 190-91 the defendant states: 
"During the hearing the judge (Judge 
Baldwin) acted completely without dignity. 
He was uninformed about the statutes he him-
self referred to. He cited examples and then 
when it came down to it, he changed the sub-
ject abruptly because it was obvious he couldn't 
follow through on the cases. Judge Baldwin 
ran true to form. 
It isn't necessary to look at daily con-
flicts in national publications. The open 
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misuse of judicial power, right here in Utah, 
is apparent every day" Thira District Judge 
James Sawaya gave as a lame excuse for the 
sentencing of a recent rate case: fI am given 
no choice in this matter by the statutes.' 
The excuse fI am given no choice in this 
matter,' used by weak judges is so familiar 
that the public gets billious every time they 
hear it.'1 
Further down on page 191, the defendant states: 
f,Judge Baldwin implies that you can be a good 
family man even if you lie and perjure and 
abandon and commit adultry." 
(All emphasis added). 
B. Regarding the court's statements about the Book. 
In view of the specific and general attacks the defendant 
makes upon the legal and judicial system in Utah in the Book, 
the trial court at the commencement of trial advised the jury 
of the general nature of the case and inquired whether any had 
opinions either for or against lawyers generally. The portion 
of which defendant saw fit to have transcribed reads: 
"The Court: Ladies and gentlemen, the 
book One Against the Storm which I'm holding 
up again, in part deals with the legal pro-
fession, and it's not the legal profession 
as a whole. I think it deals wijth the legal 
profession in Utah. Is there anyone here 
who has any opinion either for or against 
the lawyers who practice law in the state 
of Utah? In other words, do you feel they're 
either more truthful than the populous as 
a whole? If you feel that way, raise your 
hand. 
The Court: Let the record show no hands 
are raised." (R.499). 
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The record does not show any objection or expection to this state-
ment by the court. 
C. Regarding discovery. 
Concerning defendant's claims of denial of discovery rights, 
the following appears of record: 
(a) Defendants' motion to compel discovery which was argued 
to Judge Dee on the law and motion bench on February 9, 1982 re-
garding Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff 
referred to on page 13 of Appellant's Brief could not be ruled 
upon because said interrogatories were not before the court when 
defendant's motion to compel was heard (R.263), they not being 
filed until February 25, 1982 (R.68). 
(b) On September 7, 1982, Judge Fishier, who was now the 
law and motion judge, continued defendant's motion to compel dis-
covery for a special setting when the court and counsel could 
make a detailed review of the interrogatories and requests for 
production to which objections had been filed (R.191,195-7) . 
Defendant contends on page 14 of his brief that no such review 
ever took place, but then states that Judge Fishier informed Robert 
Sherlock, his attorney, that the discovery requests would not 
be allowed. There is nothing in the record to support this state-
ment. The record is devoid of any evidence that defendant or 
his attorney ever brought the motion to compel before Judge Fishier 
on a special setting. 
(c) On February 8, 1984, defendant filed a motion to compel 
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discovery (R.285) which was heard by Judge Dee, to whom the case 
had now been assigned, who took the matter under advisement (R.287). 
(d) On March 16, 1984, before Judge Dee had ruled on defen-
dant's motion, defendant filed a motion to recuse Judge Dee (R.315-
16). As a result of defendant's motion, thp case was assigned 
to Judge Fishier. 
(e) Defendant never renewed his motion to compel before 
Judge Fishier, and on May 8, 1984 defendant filed a notice re-
questing a scheduling conference and trial setting (R.332). The 
scheduling conference was held on May 14, 1984 with no reference 
to defendant's renewing his motion to compel (R.334). At the 
hearing, trial was set for July 25, 1984 and no further discovery 
matters were raised prior to the trial. 
(f) During the pendency of this matter, plaintiff volun-
tarily answered a considerable number of discovery requests which 
he deemed relevant (R.56-59, 240-47, 297-303). 
Most of the discovery defendant requested to which plain-
tiff objected was irrelevant to the issues of this case. As an 
example, defendant's First Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff 
(R.68-85) referred to at page 13 of Appellant's Brief requests 
information regarding: 
(a) Whether or not plaintiff's client Mark Wheeler requested 
an award of attorney's fees in the custody case (No. 10); 
(b) Identification of insurance policies on the life of 
Mark Wheeler (No. 17); 
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(c) Whether or not Mark Wheeler owned a .22 cal. weapon 
(No. 21); 
(d) Whether or not Mark Wheeler and his wife have had extra-
marital relations (No. 25); 
(e) Whether or not Mark Wheeler was ever employed to tran-
sport motion pictures, films or video cassettes from one location 
to another (No. 27); 
(f) Identification of plaintiff's appointments, travels 
and meetings from December 29, 1978 through December 15, 1981 
(No. 34); 
(g) Whether or not Mark Wheeler had ever had any arguments 
or disputes with anyone for a period of years (No. 46). 
With respect to Defendant's Request for Admissions (R.220-
229), containing 103 requests, referred to at page 15 of defen-
dant's brief, defendant requests admissions: 
(a) That plaintiff knew that Judge Croft had ruled on the 
Manns' grounds of abandonment was a claim with merit enough to 
order a trial and order Wheelers to post the bond to bring David 
Wheeler back to trial (No. 4); 
(b) That Mark and Sylvi Wheeler traveled from California 
to Utah to attend a Christmas party at plaintiff's residence be-
fore they were married (No. 9); 
(c) That plaintiff's answer to a question posed by Scott 
E. Savage regarding motive is contrary to the ruling of Judge 
Croft and that plaintiff knew of no incident when Manns were told 
they had no legal right to pursue custody on the grounds of aban-
donment (No. 16); 
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(d) That plaintiff has no alibi as to his whereabouts at 
the time Mark Wheeler was shot (No. 40); 
(e) That plaintiff acknowledged in a letter to Paul Liapis 
that Wheelers had had telephone calls from the Manns (No. 43); 
(f) That plaintiff was aware of Article VIII of the Utah 
Constitution at the time Judge Baldwin was assigned to hear the 
custody case (No. 53); 
(g) That plaintiff had far greater knowledge of Mark Wheeler's 
comings and goings than the defendant (No. 66); 
(h) That plaintiff's testimony of driving by defendant's 
residence tends to give plaintiff an alibi (No. 73); 
(i) That Mark Wheeler lied to plaintiff about any other 
difficulties with people other than the defendant (No. 83); 
(j) That plaintiff was requested to provide sizes for David 
so that the Manns could exchange clothes for correct sizes but 
plaintiff never did so (No. 88); 
(k) That Sylvi Wheeler's account of third persons watching 
the shooting and other circumstances surrounding the shooting 
differs in her first and second depositions and from her husband's 
depositions and from what she told the police and that which ap-
pears in the police report (No. 97); 
(1) That Paul Liapis filed an affidavit with the Colorado 
court swearing that plaintiff had made a false statement in sworn 
testimony filed with the Colorado court (No. 101); and 
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(m) That on one or more occasions plaintiff has called some-
one and arranged to have charges on traffic citations altered 
and/or dropped (No. 103). 
D. Regarding the court's evidentiary rulings at trial. 
At page 24 of his brief, defendant complains that the court 
refused to admit in evidence the Revised Rules of Professional 
Conduct of the Utah State Bar. However, the record shows that 
said rules were marked as Exhibit 1-D, and was not offered (R.355). 
At page 26 of his brief, defendant likewise complains that the 
court refused to admit a letter to the Utah State Bar. This letter 
was marked as Exhibit 14-D, but was withdrawn (R.355). Further, 
on page 27 of his brief, defendant complains that M[o]ne of the 
more blatant denials of due process" was the court refusal to 
admit, after both parties had rested (R.939), a letter which his 
counsel had never offered, and which his counsel agreed need not 
be admitted so long as the jury was advised that defendant's coun-
sel had produced the letter for inspection by plaintiff's counsel 
as requested (R.940). 
E. Regarding defendant's proposed trial evidence. 
With respect to defendant's burden to prove the truthfulness 
of the defamatory statements made regarding plaintiff, defendant 
indicated in answer to plaintiff's interrogatories that said state-
ments could be proved by the testimony of Mark Wheeler, Byron 
Fisher, Dr. Marshall, Paul Liapis, Los Angeles police officers, 
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priesthood class sources and Los Angeles attorney Morton Gramas 
(R.210-15). None of these individuals were ever deposed or called 
as witnesses at trial. Likewise, in the pretrial order defendant 
indicated that he may call five witnesses (R.340-41) who were 
not called. In fact, defendant's counsel called only the defen-
dant and the plaintiff as witnesses at trial (R.494), and read 
from one deposition. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly held that the statements contained 
on pages 42, 43, 160, 163, 178, 179, 183-4, 185, 201 and 205-6 
of the Book (Ex. 23-P) and in the Letter (Ex. 35-P) were libelous 
per se. The truthfulness of said statements were put in issue 
by plaintiff's denial of them at 112 of the Revised Amended Com-
plaint (R.165). As acknowledged by defendant's counsel at the 
beginning of trial, defendant then had the burden of proving their 
truthfulness (R.505). Defendant did not meet that burden as evi-
denced by the jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff with re-
spect to the statements in Book (R.353) and the statement in the 
Letter (R.354). 
The discovery requests to which plaintiff objected and which 
defendant did not notice for a special hearing, for the most part, 
did not relate to the relevant issues of this lawsuit. 
The conduct and rulings of the trial court in no way impaired 
defendant's right to a fair trial and, therefore, the trial court's 
judgments entered on the jury verdicts should be affirmed. 
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POINT I. 
DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE 
I, SECTION 7 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION WERE 
NOT VIOLATED BY THE TRIAL COURT'S RULINGS 
ON DISCOVERY ISSUES. 
Although defendant's Point I is couched in terms of denial 
of constitutional rights of due process, the gravamen of his argu-
ment appears to be that he was denied certain discovery. 
Beginning at page 12 of his brief, defendant contends that 
he was denied pre-trial discovery by the plaintiff, plaintiff's 
counsel and the court. However, defendant's first motion to com-
pel discovery before Judge Dee was frustrated because of his own 
failure to have the interrogatories in question in the court's 
file (R.263), a circumstance not the fault of the plaintiff, plain-
tiff's counsel or the court. As previously noted, so far as the 
record indicates, defendant did not notice up a special hearing 
before Judge Fishier to consider defendant's second motion to 
compel, after Judge Fishier continued the motion for a special 
setting. Later, on February 8, 1984, after Judge Dee was assigned 
the case, defendant filed a third motion to compel which Judge 
Dee took under advisement, but before Judge Dee had ruled on the 
motion, defendant on March 14, 1984 filed a motion to recuse Judge 
Dee (R.315-16), which was granted. The case was then assigned 
to Judge Fishier and on May 8, 1984 defendant filed a notice re-
questing a scheduling conference and trial date. Defendant never 
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renewed his motion to compel before Judge Fishier. 
The pretrial order prepared by defendant's counsel (R.336-42) 
makes no reference to outstanding discovery or any pending motions 
to compel. The trial date is set for July 25, 1984, with discovery 
to be completed by June 15, 1984. The record is devoid of any 
discovery matters being presented to Judge Fishier after he is 
assigned the case following defendant's motion to recuse Judge 
Dee. 
If defendant felt that the resolution bf any unresolved dis-
covery matters were necessary to his case, he had a responsibility 
to bring them to Judge Fishler's attention before trial, not to 
this Court's attention after trial. 
Nevertheless, when considering the substance of defendant's 
complaints, it is apparent that he suffered no prejudicial error. 
In defendant's answer to plaintiff's Interrogatory No. 16, defen-
dant set forth the alleged facts upon which he would rely to prove 
his defamatory statements (R.210-15). The interrogatories in 
question show little relationship to these alleged facts, as noted 
at pp. 13-14, supra. Similarly, defendant's requests for admis-
sions run far afield of the facts alleged }n answer to Inter-
rogatory No. 16. See pp. 14-16, supra. Farther, the requests 
for admissions generally relate to documents and transcripts which 
speak for themselves and, if relevant, easily could have been 
introduced at trial. For example: 
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"You knew Judge Croft had ruled that the Manns' 
grounds of abandonment was a claim with merit 
enough to order a trial and order the Wheelers 
to post a bond to bring David Wheeler back 
to Utah.1' (No. 4). 
"That Elder Marion D. Hanks in both his depo-
sitions has denied that the subject you stated 
as the reason for Dave Young's and your visit 
to him was never discussed." (No. 10). 
"You answered to a question posted by Scott 
E. Savage regarding motive, is contrary to 
the ruling of Judge Croft and that you know 
of no incident when the Manns were told they 
had no legal right to pursue custody on the 
grounds of abandonment." (No. 16). 
"You heard Mark Wheeler testify to having 
disputes with other people in the Navy and 
at Sun Classics before you denied the exis-
tence of such incidences on May 21, 1980 in 
Judge Winder's court." (No. 21). 
"You made the statement in writing 'since 
that is the course of action that a normal 
innocent person would take, Mr. Mann's refusal 
to take the examination can lead to only one 
conclusion.'" (No. 35). 
"Admit that you acknowledged in a letter to 
Paul Liapis that the Wheelers had had tele-
phone calls from the Manns." (No. 43). 
"Your answer to the question posed to you 
on page 181, lines 12-15, of your deposition, 
is not accurate." (No. 45). 
"On page 196 and 197, of your deposition, 
you state that on the tape of the interview 
between the Los Angeles Detectives and Stanley 
C. Mann, he had trouble understanding whose 
money the trust was. Admit that no such state-
ment or likeness of such statement is on the 
tape." (No. 47). 
"Your statement on Page 158, Lines 16 thru 
24 of your deposition is not true." (No. 
70). 
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lfYour statement made at the custody hearing 
on January 11, 1979 (found on Page 14, Line 
11 thru 14 of the transcript was not true." 
(No. 80). | 
The plain fact of the matter was that defendant was wholly 
unable to show the truthfulness of any of his defamatory state-
ments. He, therefore, sought to besmirch the reputation of plain-
tiff by getting into other litigation wholly unrelated to the 
Wheelers or the Manns. The simple issue before the jury was whether 
the defamatory statements of plaintiff published by defendant 
were true. None of the interrogatories or requests for admissions 
to which plaintiff objected were calculated to shed light on that 
issue. 
POINT II. 
DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION OR ARTICLE 
I, SECTION 15 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION WERE 
NOT VIOLATED BY THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT 
THE DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS CONSTITUTED LIBEL 
PER SE. 
Although defendant's Point II is couched in terms of denial 
of constitutional free speech rights, what defendant is really 
arguing is that the defamatory statements of which plaintiff com-
plains were not libelous per se because th^y were expressions 
of personal opinion rather than statements of fact. 
In Allred v. Cook, 590 P.2d 318 (Utah 1979) this Court held 
that 
"In order to constitute slander per se, with-
out a showing of special harm, it is necessary 
-21-
that the defamatory words fall into one of 
four categories: (1) charge of criminal con-
duct, . . . (3) charge of conduct that is 
incompatible with the exercise of a lawful 
business, trade, profession, or office; . . . . 
The defamatory words are actionable if they 
impute a want of capacity or fitness for en-
gaging in the plaintiff's profession or if -,, 
they render him unfit to fulfill his duties."— 
There can be no doubt that defendant's statements in the 
Book (Ex. 23-P) charging the plaintiff attorney with buying the 
testimony of a witness (p. 42), misdirecting the court (p. 43, 
179), dirty tricks (p. 160), lying to the court (p. 163, 185, 
205-6), violating his oath as an attorney (p. 178, 179), perjuries 
(p. 178, 183-4) and altering a court transcript (p. 201) are in-
compatible with the practice of law and would in fact render an 
attorney unfit to fulfill his duties in the practice of law. 
In addition, the charges in the Book of perjuries (p. 178, 183-4) 
and in the Letter (Ex. 35-P) are charges of criminal conduct ranging 
from a class B misdemeanor to a second degree felony. 5576-8-502, 
503 and 504, U.C.A., 1953, as amended. 
Defendant attempts to avoid the liability that attaches to 
such libelous per se statements by contending on page 29, et seq., 
of his brief that such statements were statements of belief and 
opinion and, therefore, are not actionable and cites Ogden Bus 
Lines v. KSL, Inc., 551 P.2d 222 (Utah 1976) as authority for 
1. Elements of Libel per se reiterated in Baum v. Gillman, 667 
P.2d 41 (Utah 1983). 
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such position. The facts of that case are substantially different 
from those in the present action. First, KSL is a public media 
and enjoys a qualified privilege of "fair comment'1 in the innocent 
publication of false statements. Cianci v. New Times Publishing 
Co., 639 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1980). Second, the statement in ques-
tion, Mthat the driver of the school bus involved in a collision 
with a dump truck a few days ago has been charged with driving 
on a revoked license11 was in fact a true statement as noted by 
the court at 224: 
"There is no evidence in the record showing 
or tending to show that any statements of 
fact made by defendant in the editorial con-
cerning any plaintiff were false. On the 
contrary, the facts therein stated are shown 
by the evidence to be true, and therefore 
are not actionable.11 
Third, the strongest part of the opinion portion of KSL's edito-
rial stated: 
"This fact must not lead us to make any judg-
ments as to the responsibility for this ac-
cident. However, KSL believes the conclusion 
is warranted that the operator of the vehicle, 
Ogden City Bus Lines was lax. . . . KSL 
believes it would be well for all school dis-
tricts in the state to review their policy 
for the employment of school bus drivers. 
Obviously, the lives of children must be placed 
in the care only of those who have demonstrated 
that they are competent to hold that trust." 
(Emphasis added). As can be seen, the opinion statements of KSL 
i 
were quite different than the vitriolic statements which defendant 
contends are his opinions. Defendant did not state, as KSL did, 
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that his statements were mere opinions or beliefs. For the most 
part, they were couched in terms of actual fact. 
Further, if purported facts and implied opinions are inter-
woven in an article so that the reader is presented with an opin-
ion conveyed as part and parcel of the factual disclosure, the 
"fair comment" defense available to the news media does not apply. 
Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., supra. A fortiori, a private 
party must be held liable where his opinions are part and parcel 
of the factual statement. 
Defendant cites no authority for the proposition that libel-
ous per se statements of a private person regarding another pri-
vate person are privileged if they are also the beliefs and opin-
ions of the declarant, and plaintifffs research has discovered 
no such authority. 
Since in this case there is ample evidence of libelous per 
se statements made by the defendant, the rule of Akins v. Altus 
Newspapers, Inc., 609 P.2d 1263 (Okl. 1980), should be followed 
regarding libelous per se statements made of a police officer 
wherein the court stated at 1276: 
"Where there is any competent evidence reason-
ably tending to support the verdict, this 
court does not disturb it." (Sic). 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFEN-
DANT'S MOTION FOR A CHANGE OF VENUE. 
Although defendant did not make a special point of it in 
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his brief, on page 18 thereof, defendant complains of the court's 
denial of his motion for a change of venue. Based upon defen-
dant's attack upon some judges of the Third District Court in 
his Book and the fact that some judges had heard other matters 
involving him, defendant could have legitimately challenged those 
particular judges if one of them had been assigned the trial of 
this case, but Judge Fishier was not one of those judges and was 
not mentioned in the Book. Judge Fishier notes in his minute 
entry (R.192) denying defendant's motion for a change of venue 
that: 
"The motion in effect seeks to disqualify 
every judge in this district en mass. The 
defendants may wish to challenge certain judges 
in the district but this should be done on 
an individual basis." (Sic.) 
Copies of this minute entry were maile|d to counsel on Septem-
ber 16, 1982. Defendant's counsel never challenged Judge Fishier's 
assignment to this case pursuant to Rule 63(b), U.R.C.P. Since 
that issue was not raised in the trial court, even if it had merit, 
it could not be raised at this stage of the proceedings. Utah 
County v. Brown, 672 P.2d 82, 85 (Utah 1983); Franklin Financial 
v. New Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983). 
Moreover, plaintiff had a legal right to have the case tried 
before a Salt Lake County jury in view of the fact that both plain-
tiff and defendant were residents of Salt Lake County, that plain-
tiff practices law in Salt Lake County and that the cause of action 
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arose in Salt Lake County. See, Section 78-13-7, U.C.A., 1953, 
as amended. There is no suggestion in defendant's brief that 
he could not have a fair trial before a Salt Lake County jury, 
or that the jurors impaneled to try this case were not unbiased 
or fair-minded. Neither is there any evidence that Judge Fishier 
was not fair-minded or could not, would not, or did not give defen-
dant a fair trial. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY 
AS TO THE NATURE OF THE CASE IT WAS ABOUT 
TO TRY. 
Defendant at Point III of his brief challenges the trial 
court's language in advising the jury as to the nature of the 
case it was about to try. Defendant seems to claim that the state-
ment was not a balanced one since it ffis an affront to the attor-
neys and judges which are spoken well of in the book." If attor-
neys and judges are spoken well of in the Book, it is somewhere 
plaintiff has been unable to find, and certainly is not on the 
back cover, in the Authors Note, in the Foreword, or in the chap-
ters entitled Legal Chicanery, More Chicanery and Birds of a Feather, 
the first paragraph of which states: 
"Probably the main thing wrong with judges 
is that they were previously lawyers. The 
practice of law distorts a man's common sense 
more than any other experience in the world. 
Enough exposure to the lack of ethics and 
morality common to such a large majority of 
those practicing law today would pervert the 
purposes of many a man. Some of these men 
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become judges. In many cases they not only 
hand out fallicious decisions, they also usurp, 
legally, the prerogatives and responsibilities 
of our legislatures. They hand out rulings 
not voted on by duly elected legislators such 
as school busing, secret trials, plea bar-
gaining, etc." 
The inquiry made of the jury by the court of : 
n[i]s there anyone here who has any opinion 
either for or against the lawyers who practice 
law in the state of Utah? In other words, 
do you feel theyfre either more truthful than 
the populous as a whole? If you feel that 
way, raise your hand11 
was as much in the interest of the defendant as the plaintiff. 
Considering the rather scurrilous attacks defendant had made upon 
the legal profession, it would be important for him and his counsel 
to know if there were any members of the jury which had any par-
ticular affinities for, or close relationships with, members of 
the legal profession. The statement of the court preceding the 
question is not biased. The court does not quote from the Book, 
but merely states: 
"The Book One Against the Storm which I'm 
holding up again, in part deals with the legal 
profession, and it's not the legal profession 
as a whole. I think it deals with the legal 
profession in Utah." 
Plaintiff submits that there is nothing biased or prejudicial 
about the statement or the question posed to the jury. It was 
a proper introduction of a case the jury was about to try in order 
to determine if there were any prospective jurors who may have 
had personal feelings either for or against members of the legal 
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profession, or of those who may criticize the profession. It 
is the kind of question that almost certainly would be asked of 
any prospective jurors in any case involving a practicing attor-
ney, either as a party plaintiff or defendant. 
Further, defendant made no objection to the court's statement 
and question to the prospective jurors. Even if the comments 
of the court were objectionable, such objection cannot be raised 
for the first time on appeal. Meier v. Christensen, 15 Utah 2d 
182, 389 P.2d 734 (1964). 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS EVIDENTIARY 
RULINGS. 
Although defendant has not raised the trial court's evidenti-
ary rulings as a point on appeal, he complained of them in his 
brief. At page 24 defendant complains that the Revised Rules 
of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar was not received 
in evidence. However, the record shows that it was marked as 
Exhibit 1-D, but was not offered (R.355). At page 26 he complains 
that a letter to the Utah State Bar was refused, but, again, the 
record shows that it was marked as Exhibit 14-D and that it was 
withdrawn (R.355). 
Defendant states that "[o]ne of the more blatant denials 
of [his] due process" was the court's refusal of a letter offered 
by his counsel after both sides had rested and which his counsel 
agreed need not be entered if the jury was advised that it had 
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been produced for inspection by plaintiff's counsel as requested 
(R.940) and of which the jury was so advised as agreed (R.950). 
If such circumstance represents one of the more blatant de-
nials of defendant's rights of due process, the Court can rest 
assured that defendant received a fair triajL. 
POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT VIOLATE DEFENDANT'S 
PRIEST/PENITENT PRIVILEGE. 
Defendant does not challenge the fact that a copy of the 
libelous Letter (Ex. 35-P) sent to President Ezra Taft Benson, 
which he contends was privileged, was also sent to his brother 
Charles C. Mann. Defendant makes no claim that Charles C. Mann 
held any ecclesiastical position regarding him. It is elementary 
that if a communication which otherwise would be privileged is 
communicated to a person not involved in the privilege, the priv-
ilege is lost. In Naum v. State, 630 P.2d 785 (Okl. 1981), cert, 
denied, 102 S.Ct. 609, 454 U.S. 1058, 78 L.Ed. 597 (1981), where 
a defendant's confession to a clergyman was intended to be relayed 
to defendant's attorney, it was held that testimony of the clergy-
man at trial violated neither the priest-penitent nor the attor-
ney-client privilege. 
In Utah, the priest-penitent privilege is codified as follows: 
"A clergyman or priest cannot, without the 
consent of the person making the confession, 
be examined as to any confession made to him 
in his professional character in the course 
of discipline enjoyed by the church to which 
he belongs." 
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§78-24-8(3), U.C.A., 1953, as amended. Thus, the Utah statute 
cloaks only a person's "confessions'1 to a clergyman. It does 
not protect allegations made against third parties as in the in-
stant case. Privileges are to be strictly construed since they 
"close another window to the light of truth." State v. Gotfrey, 
598 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1979). 
The trial court did not err in admitting the letter in ques-
tion since (1) the substance thereof was not a confession and 
(2) it was intentionally sent to a non-privileged third-party. 
POINT VII. 
PLAINTIFF DID NOT GIVE PERJURED TESTIMONY 
AT TRIAL. 
Defendant's last point is that plaintiff gave perjured testi-
mony at trial. This claim is based principally upon the fact 
that plaintiff's testimony differs from that of Paul Liapis re-
garding whether or not certain settlement negotiations took place 
in other litigation, and differences in testimony between plain-
tiff and other individuals which are not of record in this action. 
Suffice it to say that the testimony of plaintiff which defendant 
contends is perjured in this action is substantially the same 
testimony defendant claimed in his Book was perjured, and the 
jury in this case found that the Book was libelous, which would 
seem to indicate that it did not believe plaintiff had committed 
perjury. Further, and more pertinent, is the fact that the jury 
found that defendant's Letter to President Ezra Taft Benson was 
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libelous (R.354) and the only claim of libel made with respect 
to the Letter was that defendant had charged plaintiff with "ob-
vious perjury11 (Ex. 35-P) . It should be noted that in order for 
a person to be guilty of perjury, not only must the statement 
be false, but the declarant must have believed it to have been 
false when made, §76-8-502(1), U.C.A., 1953, as amended; or in 
the case of inconsistent statements, that one or the other was 
believed to be false when made, 76-8-502(2), U.C.A., 1953, as 
amended. Perjury does not arise from frailities of memory, inad-
vertent misstatements or differences of opipion, impression or 
emphasis. 
CONCLUSION 
The defamatory statements contained in the Book ONE AGAINST 
THE STORM and the Letter to President Ezra Taft Benson were cor-
rectly held by the trial court to be libelous per se since they 
attacked the plaintiff in his professional capacity as an attor-
ney. The jury found the defamatory statements to be false and, 
therefore, the trial court's judgments entered thereon should 
be affirmed. 
Defendant has complained that he was denied certain discovery, 
but the record shows that he failed to diligently bring such mat-
ters to the trial court's attention, particularly after the case 
was reassigned to Judge Fishier following defendant's motion to 
recuse Judge Dee. From that date to date of trial, no discovery 
was requested or unresolved discovery matters brought to Judge 
-31-
Fishier1s attention. Therefore, defendant cannot now complain 
of the lack of such discovery. 
The trial court committed no prejudicial error, either during 
trial or in its pretrial rulings. Finally, there is no evidence 
that plaintiff committed perjury during the course of the trial. 
The same testimony of which defendant complains in his brief was 
presented to the jury by the defendant in this case in an attempt 
to defend against plaintiff's charge that the Book and Letter 
were libelous. The jury found that the Book and Letter were, 
in fact, libelous, thus of necessity finding that plaintiff had 
not committed perjury. 
Both parties received a fair trial of the issues raised in 
this action and, therefore, the trial court's judgments upon the 
jury verdicts should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of August, 1986. 
RAY R. CHRISTENSEN 
GAINER M. WALDBILLIG 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
900 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent 
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PER CURIAM; 
This matter is before us en plaintiff's motion to 
dismiss defendant's appeal for failure to designate a final 
..appealable order in his notice of appeal Plaintiff also 
moves to strike defendant's entire brief because it does not 
comply with Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
and contains false and abusive references to'plaintiff's 
• attorney. We deny plaintiff's motion, but strike all 
references to plaintiff's attorney that are contained in 
defendant's brief on appeal, 
Plaintiff's motion to dismiss is premised merely upon 
defendant's defective notice of appeal, which does not 
properly designate the final judgment from which the appeal is 
taken. Utah R. App. P. 3(d). Following entry of the judgment 
on the jury's verdict, both parties timely filed post-judgment 
motions in the trial court, thereby suspending the running of 
time in which to file an appeal. Utah R. App. P« 4(b). 
Defendant's motion for new trial was later withdrawn. On 
September 23, 1985, the trial court orally granted plaintiff's 
' motion to amend the judgment. The written order granting the 
motion to amend was entered on October 8, 19 85. Thereafter, 
defendant timely filed his appeal under Rule 4, but mistakenly 
designated in his notice that the order appealed from was the 
oral rul ing of September 23, 1985. 
Although defendant improperly designated the 
September 23 oral ruling as the judgment from which his appeal 
was taken, it is clear in this case that he intended to appeal 
the entire judgment entered in August 1984 and made final by 
the court's written order of October 8, 1985. Fairly 
construed in the context of this case, defendant's notice 
informs plaintiff that defendant's appeal is not from an oral 
ruling, but is an appeal from the entire judgment. Plaintiff 
has not been misled or confused in any way as to the matters 
being appealed or the extent of defendant's claims on appeal. 
The purpose of the notice of appeal is to place the opposing 
party on notice that an appeal is being taken and to fairly 
identify the court's action being appealed. Wood v. Turner, 18 
Utah 2d 229, 419 P.2d 634 (1966); Schroeder v. Meier-Templeton 
Associates, Inc., 130 111. App. 3d 554, 474 N.E.2d 744, 748 
(1984).x When a notice of appeal from a final order is timely 
filed and the plaintiff is not misled thereby, a technical 
defect in the notice does not destroy the jurisdiction of this 
Court. Utah R. App. P. 3(a); cases cited supra note 1. 
Plaintiff does not claim or show any prejudice 
resulting from the obvious mistake in the notice. He knew that 
defendant intended to appeal from the entire judgment, 
particularly since defendant had previously filed a premature 
notice of appeal before the judgment had become final. Both 
parties had agreed to dismissal of that appeal in order for the 
post-judgment motions to be resolved and the judgment made 
final. While we expect all parties before us to comply with 
this Court's rules, it is contrary to the spirit and intent of 
our rules that decisions on the merits be avoided by mere 
technicalities when neither side is prejudiced thereby.2 We 
consider the mistaken designation in the notice to be harmless 
in this case. 
Defendant's brief already filed with this Court 
contains several accusations against plaintiff's attorney that 
are entirely unrelated to any proper resolution of the issues 
defendant presents for our review. As we stated in State v. 
Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297 (Utah 1986), derogatory references to 
others and inappropriate language have no place in an appellate 
brief and are of no assistance in a proper resolution of those 
matters legitimately prosecuted on appeal. The highest 
standards of conduct and deportment are required of those who 
appear before this Court and other courts of our state. 
We have examined those portions of defendant's brief 
containing the calumnious and impertinent language accusing 
plaintiff's attorney of impropriety. None of defendant's 
statements are supported by the record. His accusations are 
entirely groundless and unnecessarily reflect adversely upon 
the integrity and high standards of this Court and of counsel. 
After careful consideration of the record below, we find no 
basis or justification whatever for the accusatory and 
intemperate language used in referring to counsel. We 
1. Accord Widener v. District Court of Jefferson County, 200 
Colo. 398, 615 P.2d 33 (1980); Spurlin v. Paul Brown Agency, 
Inc., 80 N.M. 306, 454 P.2d 963 (1969); Beltram v. Appellate 
Dep't of Superior Court for Los Angeles County, 66 Cal. App- 3d 
711, 136 Cal- Rptr. 211 (1977); 9 J. Moore, W. Taggert & J. 
Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice § 203.18 (2d ed. 1985). 
2. Cf^ Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962); Vigil v. United 
States, 430. F.2d 1357 (10th Cir. 1970). 
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therefore order "-hat all references t pla* *"i£f's attorney be 
stricken from t bri*afO 
U Ltli respect to plaintiff's remaining claim, that 
defendant's entire brief should be stricken because the facts 
alleged therein are not supported by the record, we have 
examined the current appeal record in this case, Including the 
exhibits introduced at trial. Defendant's designation of the 
record also attempts to include material not presented to the 
court or to the jury at the trial of this case. Such matters 
are not properly part of the record on appeal and will not be 
considered by this Court when reviewing the merits of the 
appeal. Matter of Cluff's Estate, 587 P.2d 128 (Utah 1978) ; 
Campos v. Campos, 523 P.2d 1235 (Utah 1974). We note that, 
although designated, the trial transcript has not yet been 
made part of the record. Consequently, we are unable to fully 
ascertain In every instance what matters_jnay or may not be 
fully supportable by the record below. 
Wood v. Myrup, 681 P»2a 1255 (Utah 1984). 
t^ this stage of the appeal, however, it will impose 
delay and will further burden this Court and the parties to 
strike defendant's brief. Consideration of defendant's 
contentions on appeal will be unnecessarily delayed b\ 
requiring him to file a new brief. Alternatively, a greater 
inconvenience and burden would be imposed upon this Court if 
it were required to resolve defendant's contentions without 
the benefit of his arguments. Therefore, appellant's brief 
will not be stricken entirely. To the extent that the 
arguments and allegations therein are extraneous or are net 
supported by the record, they will be disregarded in reviewing 
the legitimate issues raised. 
In accordance with the principles stated herein, 
plaintiff's motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to 
strike defendant's brief is denied. Those portions of 
defendant's brief which refer to plaintiff's counsel pre 
herebv stricken from the brief. 
Zimmerman, Justice, having disqualified himself, dees 
not participate herein. 
This opinion is not regarded as adding anything 
significant to existing law and hence is not to be published 
In the Utah Reporter cr the Pacxfic Reporter. 
~. cf"! Gregoir¥^T7""National Bank of Alaska^ 413 P.2d 27," 
42-44 (Alaska), cerx. denied, 385 U.S. 923 (1966); Wilhurn v. 
Reitman, 54 Ariz. 31, 91 P.2d 865 (1939); Rnapp v, Fleming, 
127 Colo. 414, 258 P.2d 489 (1953); Meeker v. Walraven, 72 
N-M. 107, 380 P.2d 8^5, cert, denied, 375 U.S. 829 (1963); 
Kellogg v Wilrov *f Wash. ?d 558 281 P.2d 677 (1955). 
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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
WTVM Of THg CJH 
This - an appeal from a JjJ#fm*nt antare^r la^ plaintiff' s 
fawor for libal relating to statements in tb% baott' BOna, against The 
Storm* question palata ta action* and th* 
clearly i*#«,*^ opinio** and coneluaiaat drawn by appallanft from th* 
actions of plaintiff. Mayna madswortb ana) hit FAMILY C L I E N T S in 
• < ^itn- jrfgajft* «**• amtkiss ana) Campbell 
hit FAMUT cyxurra, wayn. wadsworth's 




fjfitac t*d^ *^rHI#lt^^^ 
Tha louar court rulad that cartaln ttatanants in tha book 
ONE AGAIMST Tlfg STOP* MPT* llbalOU*. Nav designation of which 
statements were tha ones which- ware llaa-lou* eJere given ii, court or 
to the defendant-appellant. 
(2) A Maw 
Judicial 0 
la«t seafca (1> Ha*. Vardlct; Set Aside. 
(3) A Change of Venue out of tha Third 
fr#TEftPT Qf ra^Tg 
- 2 -
^eler signed the f i n a l adopt ion papers four1 t h e ! ir nine monthi ol d 
lauid Mark Neuiton Wheeler, :t i i the Super ior Court orl the S t a t e 
tak ing Jd^^Neui ton Wheeler and David Mark Newton Wheel* ba< : 1 i: 1 J :  
t h e i r r e s i d e ^ ^ Mark Wayne Wheeli 1 f 1 , h i IM ^ Wi th in days, Mark 
Wayne Wadsuiorth, '^ feveler f together 'In, 1 t i ake CI ty 1 It ah f o 
c e l e b r a t e the 197S C n M t a i t ho l idays a t the res ident - ,t 
WadstAiorth. Deposl t i o n f ^ w t e i I 'eb» | | 1« r ,| l1 ! i|IM rl 
I • I' J 
On Decewbe :iif 197SWark Wayne Wheeler sign* police 
^^a^am. 
5900 Canterbury Driua #30S» Culvar^Hy, California (tha apartnant 
of Silvi Ingabrlgtsan). 
I 
C! mi in 3 a ,11 iiii, iiiiiii in i I I t T i 3 ill ill i iii (U 
from Mark Wayne Wheeler. A fin ieere* 
entered on December . WM by tUft Sup^rtW 
ef tevid fttrb $22S.OO monthly for the 
Wayne Mh#+1< 
1976 in Salfe ji£* Ctty^J 
•lar filad for diuor 
Llvd^ce teas Issued and 
#f California, of 
Wheeler I ^ 
leler In » 
leptenber 4, 
*«*^m 
anything toward* tha 
tha I M I «onth Mark Mayna Wha^fcr paid 
of Bawld «ark *m*ton whaalar, ^Pur1»<; 
Whaalar in an airlina accident, Mark Mayna Whaalar nmvr saw, 
comnunicatad uAth hit adoptad son, avan though ha u*s amara of his 
• 3 -
whereabouts and had the means to do so. Custody hearing, JggT$-l 
transcript of July 23, 1979 (letters and testimony) Stanl^PC. Mann 
- Pages 16-21. Mar jean Leu is - Pages 94-99, Gail TajiflpF - Pages 
99-107, and Bishop Kenneth Peterson - Pages 107-112. 
Stanley C. Mann filed for custody of JBTid Mark Newton 
Wheeler on the basis of abandonment of the chl^Vby the Guardian Ad 
Litem. The statutes of the State of Utah ^ ^ 3 0 - 5 , Utah Code Ann 
(SUPP. 1953) further support PetitionerV^^laim of abandonment of 
the child by providing that, if a p t i w has failed to support or 
communicate with that child * for a^ flfr'iod of one year or longer, 
there is a presumption of abandonment. In documents filed with the 
court,* the Guardian Ad Litem, ^ Trough* his brother-in-4af<attorney, 
H. Wayne Wadsworth, denied Mf^T Wayne Wheeler mm* tnjelve (12) months 
or more in arrears on supuflT to Dauid Mark Newton Wheeler 
(1) In a 
been concluded), 
arrears on child 
LAW, prepared 
Baldwin Jr., 
#(S) and (j 
exercise 
uent case (after «he custody hearing had 
* 
yne Wheeler gave testimony, that he was In 
port. In FINDINGS OF FUCT ftMD CONCLUSIONS OF 
Wayne Wadsworth- and signed by Judge Ernest F. 
Waatworth's fomer law partner EXH. #17^. Page 2 
concluded Nark Wheeler Made no attempt to 
mm- rights no paid court ordered child support for 
twenty-ojp^«£jaa*0^ak 
(2) The Superior Court of California, County of Los 
>s, ruled In November of 19«0, that Mark Wayne Wheeler was in 
»ars twenty-two (22) Months on court ordered support and levied 
pudgment for the same to the Joan Newton Wheeler estate. 
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Custody s in ii'ii] "f sought foi David Mark Newton yheeler under 
tftH^testaine oulsloi i ol " tl le 2 ewton Wheeler w i l l and Mi 
me Wad suior t h d i d i e s • a i c I i a ba i ido i Hie i 11, 
( D e t a i l * on Page ! I i ne 9 EXH #18. however Mr Wadsuiorth continued 
his Memorancfcro Decision EXH II • 2 3 • u f • u l i in m , • •III J , „. $ • II 7 , 1 979, 
wherei* ".m i | lagl||8> Judge <! * •.» f I s t a t e s : t noted, the main 'basis, 
i i i 11 ig i i i t " i1 r *"i f i f * ht» cl t:i 1 d t o 
remain with ! hi » \ which the Nanns assert 
custody 1 s 1 .he allege<Artandonmnt or desertion of 
contest between a natural parei^Land another, the sole question for 
her conduct has forfeit*<i parental 
cases abandon me nt may fa § 11 i e Q i K 1 y 
III! t a I hi i :M I 
je for determined 
iiiii > 
No 
i n f l e x i o i e i 3 a 3 d doim i I1)!1 llcl1! fuch i i i 
determined and each case must be decldecMon i t s own pari I * 
facts14 Having ruled that , due process requinRkthat the Manns have 
transcr ipt Fii | • 2" 02 and 203, Wayne Wadsworth re^t i f l ed ::i is JIIII ^  was 
rejected by tl te coui t . Mr. Ii, Wayne Wads worth ^ d his family 
i I I .»i ' , u+ to quo tatenent • ll ^ k a # Croft* s 
memorandum dec i s ion which deals only with i t e s t a * -y dnpintmei it 
uardian which provides that " a testamentary appl^Q^tment 
in which the will is probated, if before acceptance, both paints 
are dead or the surviving parent is adjudged incapacitated11 ^ nd they 
give this as the reason that Stanley C. Mann and Louij^ S. Mann 
conspired to kill Mark Wayne Wheeler. The night of ^k shooting, 
within hours of the alleged attempt on Mark Wayne Ji^eler's life, 
Silvi Wheeler made the following allegation tq^Fhe Los Angeles 
Police department. (1) Quoted the statement MrjefHadsworth continues 
to allege* citing the above, that the only j^J we could get custody 
of David Mark Newton Wheeler was ^Kat Mark was dead or 
incapacitated. (2) That whomever had^Ristody of David Mark Newton 
Wheeler would have control of the tofllt moneys. (3) Stanley C. Mann 
was the only person they had ev^Phad' any difficulties ml* disputes 
with and who might want Mark Whener dead. 
The first statement*^.* disputed by reading the complete 
EXH » 23, The second statement is 
in the will and trust of Joan Newton 
memorandum of Judge Croft^ 
contrary to the provj 
Wheeler and has no Jflrsis In fact. The third statement was 
absolutely false ac^rding to Mark Wayne Wheelers own testimony 
given March 12, MSI), with Wayne Wadsworth preterit as counsel, in 
i MET 
numerous incidegff!io*luding rage 8 thru 25 and Page 31 thru 36, and 
subsequent ^djbrmation that cane forth regarding various, legal 
actions uib^th were in the process at the tlae which resulted in 
judgmenj^against Mark Wayne Wheeler. 
On Friday, December 29, 1978, within hours of Joan Newton 
WhaWler's death, Mark Wayne Wheeler contacted United Air Lines. 
t^ nsuranc benefic iary, etc He was refused ormation 
vjDasis that United Ai i Il :l i ies had It! • ei i :l i is I ,i i IIIc I ,HI • cl 111 i m m r i t ing by 
anyone, U^ N^ f « -l  Ik3 I circumstances , IIII :  :^  :^  in • i(i: It: Stanley Mann. Mark 
Ma MheelftJI^iadt « ^ . ™* attempts, m — ^ —± • u t i l e* t :» ge I 
this ii RS sitf 
:: JanSSlk 22 1 979, " Hr Kerry Heinz (at that time the 
E)::l sli : ii :: 'Ill the Manr^j^uiard) , t •ported III • conversation which 1 , i 1 i , Il 
wherein the Wheelers ha^i&old Bishop Treu that they were going I o 
break the will of Joan fUtoton Wheeler and that by *fv*ig Silvi 
V \ i • 
of the t rus t money and d i sso lve^toe t rus t according to the provision 
f ounci in i IP a g e 2 in ii Joan NeuUrn WW^er ' l ta i l l , >are***ph-#4 i i  j ' i 
then the t rus t provided herein for TOjk care < il ' my nil lor - c 
h l ldr .n 
shal l taralnata ami s h a l l fea d l s tr lbutJ lyfent lrc ly to tha guardians 
thJAfraa and banaflt of tha 
guardians and-*ta»|^,«aj|fl|Bt faadly • 
According t<^ t»» EXM #11 l a t t a r s 
non*?iC*Et* tftt^kha 
^rn^r-^m 
February 14, 1979 
" 27, 1979. 
and March 9. 197*. Mart ttayna Whdalar alraady^toqaaad tha law 
firm of Stewart. Young ami Paxton for tha purpoaa o%^chall«nging 
tine 18-20 t r i a l t ranscr ip t . Wayna Wadsworth danlas Mark Whknar's 
- 7 -
^7a», 
actions. All of tha above actions occured prior to the alleged 
attempt on Mark Wayne Wheelers life, (which the conspirators alleged 
was perpetrated by tha Manns to accomplish tha very thing they 
already were attempting to do) 
Sometime in lata March I did inform Mark Wayne Wheeler that 
I was moving the trust money into Western Marketing Resources Inc., 
stock. I felt that in order to accomplish tha request made by Joan 
* 
Newton Wheeler of me, verbally, in her last will, and in letters, it 
would be judicious to invest tha money in Western Marketing 
Resources, Inc., as she had reqyeated at an earlier pariod of time. 
I did later, on July la, 1979, through my attorney, Paul 
Liapis, make an offer to tha Guardian Ad Litem, -through his 
attorney, H. Wayne Wadsuorth, to put tha trust fund in a Corporate 
I made this mffmr in order to determine If thair real 
interest was In »alftta4ftin« th* security af tha trust or getting 
access to the money. aatf^ X alee had) become very concerned regarding 
my ouat aacui 
ntng an* abusive the office began to 
and at our tmm. « r 3m*« a^idjppf^durina one ef these calls, my 
lite was threateaaiim£B""T!ta last of June 1979, upon my attorneys 
returj^aapur-tfalifornia to take depositions relative to the custody 
8 
burglary and the forging of checks of Mark Mayne Wheeler's neighb^# 
through a deposition taken by H. Wayne Wadsworth. In respor^^rto 
Mr. Wayne Wadsworth's question, Mrs. Norma Waldroan, a ne^ffor of 
the Wheelers testified relative to this incident. Sh^flPEated she 
had reported the incident to the Wheelers and Mark uMeler told he 
he thought if might be in connection with the unjmWwho was trying 
to get custody of David Mark Newton Wheeler^flr Sometime later 1 
learned that on June 20, 1979, Wayne Wadsw^fln, of and for Watkiss 
and Campbell, Attorneys for Mark Wayne^^eeler, had caused this 
action to remove me as Trustee, to baflPlled in the Third District 
Court, C-79-4063 EXH » 20 . Please^Ke on Page 5 of this action to 
remove me as trustee. Item H jjr This was filed w4€h-*H Wayne 
Wadsworth having prior knowledj^that his client was in violation of 
the statute on abandonment^md supposedly with no prior knowledge 
that the statute of abatywiHint would ifr~ be considered; enforced 
nor upheld in the cout^#of Judge Ernest F. Baldwin Jr., during the 
custody hearing scheduled for July 23, 1979. 
The Poller investigation of the alleged homicide attempt 
was only five^flseks old, and according to H. Wayne Wadsworth's 
deposition, ymmxx on f*truary 22 and 23, 19t2, ho has never had, nor 
at that tlnM&Ld he have any evidence to link either of the Manns to 
that a^pmpted homicide, and admitted that the Los Angeles 
DetecUros had informed (not only him but his clients also), that 
theujraid not have any evidence to link the Manns with an attempted 
horaxide. In spite of this, these charges were made in this trust 
(©(lit EXH » 20 -and admitting that neither they nor the Los Angeles 
-9-
|Oolice detectives had any new evidence, Wayne Wadsuiorth and his 
F m l y Client, the Guardian Ad Litem, caused to be filed on December 
28, " ^ * in the U. S. District Court for the District of Utah, 
Central DMLsion, a Civil Action C-79-0772W which accused the Manns 
again of t n l ^ attempted homicide. EXH # 3J5 After months of 
harassment, in JJLch there was a complete absence of any discovery, 
all causes of this aktion were dismissed with prejudice, on a motion 
by Mark Wayne Wheelerl^^fco Guardian Ad Litem. (Two causes of action 
were dismissed on July ^^kl9*0 and the- last cause of action on 
August 4, 1980) EXH # 10 an^fc^ 
Prior to the aboue i c ^ n being dismissed against Stanley 
C. Mann, Louise S. Mann was m n 'a Summary Juclgmeadf by the 
Honorable David Winder on May 21, l^ fc- Immediately following the 
hearing regarding the Summary Judgmenl^Wayne Wadsworth, acting on 
behalf of the guardian Ad Litem, made 4naffer to ?r,e Manns to drop 
all actions, (includirg the trust action! 
California, and leave Mr. Mann as trull^, without further 
harassment, on the condition that Stanley C. Mai^Land Louise S. Mann 
would waive all claims or cause of action that l w « may have for 
libel, slander, or m*$l«lous prosecution against thiraHl Litem, Mark 
Wayne Wheeler and any of his attorneys. EXH # 27. (SwSLtestlmony 
of attorney. Cordon L. Roberts) This was immediately decliwB^ 
Subsequently the Guardian' Ad Litem, Mark Wayne WheeJW^his 
wife, Silvi Wheeler, and their brother-in-law attorney, Tfl&P* 
Wadsworth, were found guilty of Malicious Prosecution by a jury T^ 
the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County. Salt Lake 
n - Utah, Colorado and 
-10-
C i v i l C - 8 0 - 9 9 6 1 , EXH # 
Mann us Mark Wayne W W e e T e r ^ a ^ j | B P P I S ^ r 5 r ^ and Waylie~ Wads worth 
S i m i l a r act ions a ^ ^ g M f l ^ l ^ ^ a y n e Wadsworth and Watkiss and Campbell 
by S t a Q ^ g p ^ T ^ Mann are present ly pending i n the Thi rd J u d i c i a l 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant/Appellant's right of "Due Process11 as provided in 
the U. S. Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Utah 
mere violated by the refusal of discovery relative to issues vital 
to the preparation of his defense. *&*- rights 4f freedom of 
speech, expression of beliefs, opinions, and the right to enter 
evidence critical to hit defense, including but not limited to his 
rights of rebuttal to present evidence ef tft» continuing perjury of 
the plaintiff, Wayne ttadsworth, haw* been*' withheld. Defendant/ 
Appellant's rights to a fair trial were W m i by- an expression of 
personal opinions state* by the Judge: 
Defendant/Appe>)£*nt believes that a lie told in court, 
whether •dveytac* «bjgjgfc» t* still a lie. that all officers of the 
court must? tif-neldr aSbwttable for statements Made in the courtroom 
and in the^frleadireeitf which, are false and are known to be false at 
the time uttered or^written, otherwise they haue violated the oath 
taken at their *we*Fine 1A and violated the integrity of'the court. 
The Oefendant/nppellant believes that his authorship of the 
book "One Against the. Storm", which was critical of some Third 
-11-
District Court Judges, precludes the Defendant/Appellant being able 
to receiue a fair trial in the Third Judicial District. Defendant/ 
Appellant belieues Judge Dauid B* Dee and Judge Philip R. Fishier 
intentionally, as biased individuals, refused to allow Stanley C. 
Mann the discouery to prepare his defense and to enter euidence and 
present testimony to the jury which mould have supported his 
defense, while allowing opposing counsel to use those same 
» 
information sources being denied Defendant/Appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINll 
THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S RIGHTS TO "DUE 
PROCESS1* .GUARANTEED BY THE .FIFTH 4MENOMENT TO 
THE U. S. CONSTITUTION AND . ARTICLE I. 
REPEATEDLY DENIED. THE "EQUAL,* PHOTECTION" 
CLAUSES OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND 
ARTICLE I, SEC. 24 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
WERE REPEATEDLY DENIED. THEREFORE. THIS 
TRIAL MAS EXTREMELY BIASED' AND JUDGMENT MUST 
BE DISMISSED. 
The facts are clear froei the data of the- first set of 
Interrogator!**- me$$4g| to Mayna Wadsworth and hie attorney. Ray R. 
Christensen, ttiat tho* would fo to any lengths to deny discovery 
rights to defendants^ even openly stating falsehoods in court, by 
The DEFENDANT'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO Plaintiff. 
Wavne Wadsmorth. mailed 29th of December 1961. mere never answered. 
The DEFENDANT'S FIRST REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS to 
-12-
Plaintiff, Wayne Wadsuiorth mailed the 28th day of December 1981, 
were never produced. A motion to compel discovery dated February 2, 
1982 was filed and hearing on that motion was held on February 8, 
1982 before Judge David B, Dee. Ray Christensen alleged 
i 
interrogatories did not pertain to my defense, which was patently 
went directly to the statements in the book "One Against the Storm", 
which accuses Wayne Wadsuiorth of perjury* lying* and attempting to 
mislead the court. The Judge never did m*ke a ruling. 
Another MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY AMD FOR SANCTIONS was 
delivered to Wayne Wadsuiorth*s attorney and the court on February 9, 
1982, prior to another hearing before Judge David B. DtfRequesting 
answers to FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES. numbers 1 thru 21. 
Attached to that motion was an example, clearly demonstrating- the 
legitimacy of 'Questions as^ed in rthe interrogatories. Ray 
Christensen repeatedly said any question relating to P-79-2 in Third 
District Court C-79-4063 in Third District Court and C-79-0772W in 
U. S. District Court, wherein Wayne Wadsuiorth representing a FAMILY 
CLIENT (so noted by Wayne Wadsuiorth in the courts) accused Louise S. 
>Mann and Stanley C* H u m of knowingly lying. Conspiracy to Commit 
First Degree Murder, and many other acts of moral turpitude, were 
among other*;. ..a* ^ ottreaa^Xrbpf.yefticti Stanley j.cr HaVm ^g«¥f&red 
information g»owMJtti&ti"'ny . o*t«ds" hri'r . beliefs '" and. conditions 
regarding Wayne Wadsuiorth •$ actions. Due process is absolutely 
denied, if discovery into matters involved around those suits (which 
-13-
Wayne Wadsworth filed for his FAMILY CLIENTS) is not allowed. |P 
**** Willi! U'lf H l l l l f W IIPJ "nil, rii Ml Ml knowingly 
Wm***a**aeg&UmmmmmWm See Stanley C. Mann letter and 
accompanying attachments sent to Judge David B. Dee, dated November 
25. 1983. EXH. # 3 . I went to the expense of having that one 
hearing transcribed for the purpose of drawing to the attention of 
Judge David B. Dee that mmmmmmev^^Fim 11W**" ***** 
Sherlock, Attorney for Stanley C. Mann filed another MOTION TO 
COMPEL DISCOVERY. '' A hearing was field September 7, 1982. before 
Judge Philip R. Fishier. On October 4, 1982', Judge Fishier issued 
an order, Item number 4 of that order stated: "That defendant's 
motion to compel discovery is continued to a date when court and 
counsel can make a detailed review of the Interrogatories and 
request for production to which objections have been filed". t H 
1983, Stanley C. Mann, pro se., wrote a letter to Judge David B. Dee 
with a copy of the transcript of the hearing held in his court on 
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February 9, 1982 and pages 281 and 282 of a deposition taken twelve 
days later by attorney, E. Scott Savage, of Wayne Wadsworth on 
February 23, 1982, gluing irrefutable evidence that B|B9i^|MilP00 
mini fin r i r r r rn nim"iiinn n im ^ i j i i*«r JRHT 
MHNMHeMBBM.^^ EXH 
# 3 . The evidence was ignored and never addressed. On December 
8, 1983, Stanley C. Mann pro *#., served on Wayne Wadsworth 
DEFENDANT'S SECOND SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO PLAINTIFF. On January 
9. 1984 PLAINTIFF'S ANSWERS TO DEFENDANT'S SECOND SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES were filed. , The answers were superficial and 
deceptive, in that they just deny, without answering the questions 
in detail as asked. On December 16, 1993, Stanley C.*tiaflfc, pro se, 
aw 
served on Wayne Wadsworth DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS WITH 
103 REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS. EXH » 2* . numbers 67, 68, 4 6* as 
noted in the s tements in the body soothe document/-) 
simple denial of- UH|tj|Peque*t for admission would certainly not be 
burdensome to a eerttf* if it were not se. The remaining 99 
requests for admission, all are clearly identifiable by Wayne 
Wadsworth and his counsel as being related to the cases, wherein he 
represented "his FAMILY CLIENTS, and the sources identified in the 
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back of the book, "One Against the Storm11. EXH # 34. Pages 
218-221. The Q8JECTION TO DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS 
signed and served by Wayne Wadsuiorth's counsel, Ray Christensen, on 
January 17, 1984, is 
• • • • • • • • ^ I g B u s e d t 0 deprive Stanley C. Mann of due process of 
law. Each request for admissions could have been denied or 
admitted in far less time than the answers Stanley C. Mann gave to 
Wayne Wadsuiorth's attorney, Ray Christensen in answering all 
requests. Statement in Ray Christensen*s MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANT'S REVEST FOR ADMISSIONS, also dated January 
I98** (•••••••MHHNLM "* review 
the requests will clearly show that they do not by and i*rge relate 
to the issues of this case, but rather to other cases pending 
between these parties11. This is clearly not the case. Wayne 
Wadsworth, Nof and "for Watkiss and '6ampbeIV* filed suits, arranged 
for other lawyers to file suits and re#*atrent the Wheelers (his 
4 
relatives), as well as, negotiated the terms ef the legal service, 
arranged for the advance of moneys from tha accounts of Watklss and 
Campbell to the other attorneys, prepared documents and had those 
documents ^ **fne*> 
attornaya\ 
fuarantaa paynant for aarvlcas to tha other 
16 
Both of these cases resulted from Wayne Wadsworth's 
actions in representing his FAMILY CLIENTS. The book "One Against 
the Storm" tells this story and lists in the back of the book the 
major sources of this information. On January 30, 1984, Stanley C. 
Mann, pro se..^yfrued ANSWER TO OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANT'S-rREftJ EST 
FOR ADMISSIONS AND MOTION TO COMPEL. Attached to the motion (for 
the second time) to the attention of Judge Dauid B. Dee, 
EXM • 
Wayne Wadsmorth, himself, made, all of these other suits 
relevant when he filed C-79-0772W. EXH # 35 . by including 
information from these suits as part of his complaint. 
On February 7, 1984, Stanley C. Mann pro se, prepared three 
motions. 
1. MOTION TO DISMISS FPU FAILURE TO PROSECUTE. 2. MOTION 
FOR EXPEDITED TRIAL SETTING. 3. MOTION FOR HEARING ON MOTION TO 
DISMISS AND MOTION TO COMPEL, (which mat still pending from January 
30, 1984). The hearing mas held before Judge *5avid B. Dee, on March 
2, 1984. Argument mas heard on my motion to compel. Judge Dee said 
he mould take it under advlseiifont. I stated to Judge Dee "I am 
going to be given due process of lam, mhich includes the rights to 
discovery or I mill have no choice but to file a suit against Wavne 
Wadsuiorth, Ray Christensen. and Judge Dee himself, othermise I could 
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not defend myself,M I asked for immediate rights of discovery and 
an expedited trial setting, or that the suit be dismissed for lack 
of prosecution. At this point. Judge Dee looked at his calendar, 
and after some discussion, set the trial date for June 6, 1984, W 
I heard nothing from Judge Dee during the next 
week* then on Monday, March 12, 1985, I received a letter from Judge 
Dee, dated 'March 2, 198*,^  postmark** March 77 198*, EXH » 3 . 
kA-t ** > 
There is nothing in this lette/^that Judge Dee, Wayne WadsworthV*and 
in all likelihood, Ray Chri*,tensen had' not knoum for a number of 
years prior to the first hearing in this case. This all mas after 1 
had been denied a preliminary injunction, rwm±*4f discovery * 
requests, and denied a Chang* of Venue, which had been requested on 
tha basis of judicial blaa. 9aa AFFIDAVIT OF STftWLEV C. HaMN IN 
SUPPORT OF HOTIOW TO CHUMGI UEMUE. EXH #*£_•r *r". Christensan 
c adamantly objected to a Chang* of Venue oil tha" basis Mr. Wadsuiorth 
had a right to b* judged by hi* p**r«. For tiao (2) years Judge 
Dee. Wayn* Wadsuiorth? amd Rap Carls ti»n tan completely concaalad the 
relationship that exit*** Midi* Judg* 0mm'a ruling* added cost of 
thoua«n4^.ndttpi^^flHpi upwsslmry o»p*nt* %» mm. In pursuing my 
rights of;3lfeoMar)p^3w my attempts to get a change of venue. The 
order *i9mgl&±T~,&*& *>•• am, .March 2, 1M2. item 2 states: 
'Defendant ~mma*r ****** * —**f» TO c — « L Qisearetv is l* taken 
under advisement pendingv reviam by tha ceurt of PEFENOAMT' a- REQUEST 
FOR ADMISSIONS. It sh*uld b* n*ted In Judge Dee's letter that he 
never did lrsue an order one way or the other on my HOTIOW TO COMPEL 
-18-
DISCOVERY. It continued -to be ignored without a formal decision 
- 4 
ever filed. On March 14, 1984, attorney Robert Sherlock filed 
MOTION FOR RECUSAL AND FOR SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT TO TRIAL JUDGE, and 
. iLaSpbsted JDdge Judith Billings would be appropriately assigned to 
the matter as she had no connection to the defendants nor had she 
been Trt^lued with any suit involving defendants. In Mr. Ray 
Q^rJU*0tuenU ^lottor^to^Judge vrn¥ regarding this matter, dated March 
21, 1984, Mr. Christens#^^A^^ctecr to Mr. ^ Sherlock's suggestion on 
the basis the defendants would be hand picking a judge. In the 
very same letter to Judge Dee, Mr. Christensen made the following 
comment: "Judge Fishier has heard some motions in connection with 
this, case and therefore has had soma prior contact uAChr'it and if 
^*ff^Judge is to bo specially assigned to try this, ho would seem to 
i - *s 
US to be tin .B»*t^loric>r1lhotc*',>.- It appears tay Christensan and 
Mr. Wayna Wadsuiorth were tha onas '%uccess^U>; in. porsonally hand 
picking thair own judge who had haard two wealds. (11. MOTION FOR A 
CHANGE OF UENUE - which ha daniad aftar Ray Christensen's adamant 
argument that Wayno Wadsworth had a right to bo judgad by his p*er$ 
uihara ha resided. (2) HOTIOil TO COMPEL DISCOWEKY - which he 
continued and no flf jto| wat ever issued. At tho tiae Judge Fishier 
was assigned to tho case permanently and an expedited date of trial 
-19-
I had no choice but to go 
ahead, belleuing as my attorney advised met that he mould be able to 
bring out the facts uie knew during., the trial. Because of the 
nature of my business and the 
In spite of the 
declaration by Mr.' Chrlstensen thtft discovery into Civil P-79-2, 
C-79-4063, C-79-0772W (uiherein Mr. Wayne' Wadsworth and his Family 
Client had charged my wife and myself with Attempted First Degree 
Murder) a C-Sl-8644 were not related to this Libel suit, Mr. 
Chrlstensen opened the subject of P-79-2. See page 25, line 23 
through Page 27. line 13 and on Page 27, line 14 through 20 of libel 
trial transcript. **•. Chrlstensen opened the subject of C-79-0772W 
__. _^ that Wayne 
Wadsworth *W gUtlLY CLIENTS had alleged in that suit during his 
opening stat««£n* in,., t h t ^ W i t r j W , , „ . . J J i p p 
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against Stanley 
II I" 1 1 " • Ii 198 0 
M a II II in in i w j t I in prejudlc nil! fa j i 1 1 i n Honorable Jud g ill! • I ) • iiii , jii i d 
Again 
re lat ing to the Material Mr. Christens •i Il ^ IIII oi :i insisted uias not 
conferring with his c l i e n t , Wayne Wadatiiorth) attempted to make 
point cif " \ .1 le defendant11 i knowledge relati<#%# t* certain things 
f 
brought = j il I • >• i .ybjact • I May it* Uadta*rth • i FHWlLt CLIEHT'S 
deposi t ions taken March 12. and March, r: 1 9*0 " Il m ^ ^ : i i i .i > C-79-0772W. 
Mr. Wadsworth t e s t i f i e r ill il /ill! IIII " 1 , Stanley C. Mann iw is present tuhi i i til i »s- i 
d#potltl*a*-. wmm* *****m£B "* • *** have kneatt- c t n t m thing* . (1 " Il Il 11 
Trial transcri|rt/ f0(m 417, beginning :i i i Il ill in in 22 ^ IIII mi through Page 
Il I 1 1 j n* 1 2„1 I Eu< ^ 
ill ,11 ^ ! il
 t ill ,11 < - ill , siiasiii §f 
Stanley C. Mann teas present does not mean 
mat accy* 
- 2i-
Aftor Mr;*Chrlston»<in conferred with Wayne Wadsworth, 
the following exchange took place ." " (Page *18 - Vine 1 through line 
12 (Libel Trial Transcript). 
Q. (Mr. Chrlstensen) War* those deposition* taken? 
A. (Mr. Wadsworth) Ye* Sir, they wore. 
Q. Wo are talking now about the depositions of Mark and 
Sllwl Wheeler. 
A. Yos Sir. 
Q. And those wore in connection with what is called "The 
Federal Case? 
A. Yes Sir. 
Q. In those depositions or in the deposition of Mark 
Wheeler, firet of all. Did'Stanley Mann attend that 
deposition. Do you retail? 
A. Yes. ho did. 
T (Libel Trial Transcript). (Again- on 
Q, And at that deposition you say Mr. Mann attended the 
deposition of Mark wheeler. 
&MM^£%£Z*9f: .«»»..-<** .— 
v:*dJb£ 
-•wky. Mr. M*tfs«orth told a blatant 
;Ile^rfHe.^a^^^^ 
haue yefy-^asily. verified this%nf driation before using this false*' 
-22-
Way na Wad tu»orth mi i m $ i m • pra s antad 
uy Ray Christansan frow tha tliM Louisa Mann filesT her.,*jwit 
against hi»5 N i j _ ., 
nave' been tgtally dishone* 
that tha interrogator!* 
******* ^ ***<«*< 
material 
tha act ions ui *? 
C-79-4063 , C -7 f - f772» 
«f$»* 
! : : tha If representation- -to the^-car-^ 
il  iiiiiii dmi s aloha wane not re1euant* 
>rgumants- :JI n f rout »©.£, Judao F i lh ler Wiat 
: ^ » - > ' v > • ' • ^ " ; J 
I and t h e o u t c o m e o I ill i a a t i l l i Il •>. "IJ1-/, 
not re levant . See lauised Ajowded 
Conplaint C- i l« i«4* f i l e * fry 




III ill | themselves made those three case 
and lie tc nowledged - > * c omplain t . In item ^ * r 
s t a t f * L l%h£^Ap9k refers 
mentioned. abou* ' Wadsuiorth and S" s i1 Chr l i t ensen rea l i ze 
ir admi s s i o n s a • i r a 1 a! 11 i g 1 o 
Wayne MadsuiortI it s act ions and t: :n > answer those interroga o Hi e s 
honestly, would have proven Wayne Wadsworth's guilt of every 
Allegatiott*,~~©pinioir and assumption uihrlch I made regarding him In the 
book*"One Against the' Storm". The only chance of a defense Was to 
hid*;, information, deceive, abuse the judicial system and continue to 
.give False- testimony -under oath. T**o rulings df the "courCiniouied 
«them~~£o deny diVcovery, which enabled theaMEo continue^ this**Travesty 
of the court. 
Discovery was requested properly under Rule 33. 34 and 36 
of the URCP and denial of this discovery, by itself, should be 
grounds for overturning the results of this trial. 
In furtherance of denial of due process. 
-24-
• * * • ; • * . ^ * jn *a * * - A . i F v J i ; 
- 2 5 -
:*»*>.• ^xt^^m^^^^^^^^t^^. 
•s <*&-* **>«*-*-




^, i**5lstejfisen> Mr ^  Wadsworth; ~fthe> **ftfSA"» any 
complaints filed; against ••^v':h^T-^Vy9tdhiWf^^'^^'^'^SSlt of 
series of litigation^. ^ 
f>*^^IV^i|lh*w« Y^"*^** «"y disciplinary. proceedings -«fainst~you in 
the Utah State Bar? 
A. None, or anywhere else. 
• ' • * - • • • * , . * * ! » ' 
..„=INM1«M«.J*-: 
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&.. .One of t ha more b l a t a n t den ia ls o I di § • 'process: -occurred 
over i , r u l i n g 4Mbt then at, i si mrsal • ::i ii Ill iJllli m ] i III i" -i u l i h g • by"" . Jt idge 
" • • -
produce is , 111 e 111r wh1 c In c o n t a i nad i n f o m a t i o n Way ne Wad suio r t h ma s 
" iii1 - *T 
all 1 communication want through count* til i< i ordered* I |: i ' :: ^  :il i : i ill 1: II ^ 3 
l e t t e r dur ing tha lunctt*feraak III n i Robart'r Sherlock tendered «c to the 
• 
meeting ::li :ha*bars # Judge F l s h l a n c i l l a t e d ' Il < > III l lou i ing il  Il e 
l e t t e r III ' : 1: i > : i tint reduced* but d i d determine what was going il , : > III :  4 ^  
' : : ii it iii .ii ^ : i ,1 , a > jll ii S u m I: mi 11 .11 1  > IIIIIII ^ 1:1 il l ( 1 1 -1 1 1 ill: 1 11 1 1 
25 1  agi "I • 1 ^ l i o * a f $ » £ t h r u 1 " > argument than ensued Il "il ^  ^ Il 1: .1 
1 S i .ill ' , 2 C) Ill Il .Chri* fc*n**n d id not even want the contents : I i ill 
testimony Judge f i s h i e r t h e 1 1 ffusecf 1 a l low tha l e t t e r I I I 
Pa f t n though Judge F U k ' ! d r 
hims* > s ta ted l e t t e r would 1  icit lb 1 ^  tmembered lb 1 1 ' i 1 te j i ii" 1 * See rage 
- 2 7 -
^ 4 5 3 / ^ l i O M * . 1» "tftPtcW.-^-On* P«g«r-#i2. ' l ines 210-20, Judge Fishier 
**-<* *wj *«*•*"•» 
communicated to the jury that the letter was produced: 
Wadsuiorth, himself, deposed Dr. Robert Marshall, his 
CLIENT'S pediatrician, on June 28, 197*. 
> * - * . * * ! „ ; J?!*.- / • 
i l • • { , ; f * f * i . t . 
* * " ^ 
frfayne 
FAMILY 
THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S RIGHTS TO FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH. STATEMENTS Of BELIEF ANO/Ot OPINIONS. 
GUARANTEED IV THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE U. S. 
CONSTXmfXON AN© ftRTICLE I . SEC. IS OF THE 
• , '
 I I W I I I L M P I M °* ^ A N . ***** REPEATEDLY DENIED. 
THCRE1MK BEING DEPRIVED OF DISCOVERY AND 
' EMTRANOC: OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE AT TRIAL. 
^ OEFENOAWt-APPELLANT MAS NOT AILE TO SHOW SOUND 
ft£ASOf£jfeR ARRIVING AT HIS BELIEFS AND/OR 
ENIC«i i WHICH HE STILL RIGHTFULLY HOLDS. 
THEREF«*r JUDGMENT MUST BE DISMISSED. 
*r* 
An action for libel per %• must allege * statement falling 
Into on* of four categories: It must state that the complainant has 
committed a crime; it mutt directly injure the complainant in his 
-28-
trade or pro f e $ s 1 o n; i t »• •« i m p u t a a 111 o i , t I i s o mi a cl 1 $ a a s a::: ::::: i :l I tit i i s t 
impute unchast l ty 1,1 t111e complainan t :1 s IIIII yoman, lii it tII iii sit :iii , st> ii ' 1 ,.II ^ 3 ^  
!i ,11 Ill IIIII n a t i o n s :: I il ,1 ^  iii!! complaint clearly allege that the statements from 
trade : i p r o f e s s i o n , 11 IIIII • IIIII , tit an a t to rney it/l „ 111 aw 445 -2 -2 U.C.ft. 
I i i ill Jill ijllli it IIIII , :t ::l oi i t l i • p l a i n t i f f has t i s 4 ill ,1 i i - III l l eged nor 
damages i i IIIII ii i :i i: a l l e g e d ac proven, the l i b e l must be l i b e l i tin 
a l leged l i b e l par . lo IIIII :: ill ^ v it rill common n o t o r i e t y t h a t the 
i n j u r y :. it jii IIIII lb iiiiiii presumad from the words a lone" . ftlffea** v Cook, 
. i ' 
t 0 tot construed according , to t h a i it lis i |. ii popular , and Common 
(Utah 1966) . 
1 IIIIIII it app l y i n g thaaa ru les ::i ' if 1 IIIII in it IIIII ^ iia ^  it 11uations :f 1 ' : in 
languagi • 111 i • capable of I: JIIIII i IIIIIII • Jill .i i t e r p n t a t i o n s , ont of which may !!:: in 
l i b e l per IIIIIII IIIIIII ' iiimi one which may not oe n o e i par IIIIIII IIIIIII , (J it IIIIIII ^  l ( tiiiiiti Jim 3' ttip •! * IIIII 'in i 
Court has followm** t*e position that sucl statement (capable 
more than on* interpretation) cannot be libel per se. and special 
damages must be plead and proven. Allred v. Cook, supra. 
It It well established'Utah law that statements of belief 
°r opinion, denominated at such by the speaker or writer, ar« not 
actionable as libel or slander. Qgden Bus lines v K.3.L.. Inc bbl 
P2d 22? (Utah 1976"). In this this case the Utah Supreme Court 
upheld both the First Amendment to the U. 3. Constitution and 
Article 1. Sec. 15 of the Constitution of Utah, MThe right of 
comment is not restricted to a statement of the naked facts. As a 
general rule it may include the right to draw inferences or express 
opinion from facts established. The soundness of the inferences or 
opinions is immaterial whether they are right or wrong, provided 
they are made in good faith and based upon truth." 
In applying these wall established rules of Utah law to the 
allegations of tha Revised Amended Complaint in this action, it is 
clear that, in the absence of proof of special damages (which the 
plaintiff, in tha pretrial order has admitted does not exist), the 




MATURj OF STATjftSMT 
Mann's belief that matter 
would be dropped 
Statement that doctor's 
testimony was 'bought' 
(10) (C) Misdirecting court 
REASON 
Statement of opinion 
opinion or belief. Does 
not. Allege champerty or 
barratry. . 
«XH #141 Pg. 183-187. 
Opinion ("seemed") 
Statement was "it 
seemed to me" 
Ambiguous usage of 
language. Slang 
expression properly 
designated as defined 
In Mobster's New World 
Dictionary. Page 1682 
under Quotation marks 
EXH # 12 under 
correct and commonly 
accepted English. 
EXH # 34. Page 42. 
Ambiguous, (What is 
misdirecting)? 
EXH # 34. Page 42-60. 
10 (D) Dirty tricks Ambiguous, (What is 
misdirecting)? 
EXH # 34, Page 160-161 
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t r% t T \ 
*iO"<K'> 
Opinion concerning 
a 111ra11 on% , to recc • i ; iflllli 
Occurrence in front of 
-^.—Federal Court 
SUBPARAGRAPH NATURE OF STATEMENT REASON 
113 i*
 E ^ wadSii*ortr, * s ) IIII i 3: : ^  i , 1 Not dlractad to 
character. profession; statements 
of opinion9 and 
ambiguous 
Opinion 
im #_3 * I ' g I S • 8 2 31 
States nothing.about 
Plaintiff, Ambiguous 
opinion aboutf Mark 
Wheeler's employment. 
EXH » 34 Pag« 204-207. 
• Each of these subparagraphs falls to meet the requirement s 
! or clear§ unambiguous language capable of only'" one interpretation 
i 
standards IF i in l i b e l per se under Utah lam 1:1: wa i 4>ejjp error il ,. : > 
allow such a l l ega t ions to become the ' subject of Jury de l iberat ions . 
Mann and Stanley C i i :i il " IIIIIII /ttempttrff to ~tom&L' F irs t Degree 
Murder. An a l l e g a t i o n which I t f a l s i I f W*f ut Watfaworth and I s 
themselues t they would not have dismissed with prejudice the o»t iiii ^ 
:
'*-*. i ip 
) ''^r^ #Madsworth and" hit FAMILY CLIENTS knew of the evidence 
3i-
The evidence which has come forth suggests Wayne Wadsworth 
and his expert uiitness kne|* the shooting was going to take place 
before it happened and had already gathered Information to point to 
Louise S. Mann and Stanley C. Mann in their attempt <&o*djframe them. 
In Wayne Wadsworth's own wordt "Any innocent nan would want 
everything brought out in the open to clear himself. Until Wayne 
Wads worth mmmmmmmmmmmVmmVmmmml di»contimm? abating the Judicial 
System and permit discovery, the Defendaifi/ftppellant will continue 
the early hours after midnight, Wayne Madsworth admitted driving 
past the"Mann's home to check on them. Three days later on Monday, 
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1 1 S III "! ,1 ! • •• i jii • Renchler • , • I CI • I • i ill ' Deputy Sherlf I Shephe r 
] ::i i 11 :::i i i 3 i 1 1 IIIIII I lai 1 1 is t 0 • 1 1 1 mi 1 hooting . 
H H H H H H t t H B H ^ * * k € defendant/appe 1 1 a 1 1 (: t i g I 111 1 11 1 y 1 1o "1 ct s 11 1 i s 
be l i e f and as ser t s that any judgment bi ought agair is t: I iii 1 il c II ::l s 
b e l i e f s , before our presentl 11 JI ' 111 - unjust and must be dismissed. 
POINT II I 
J U D G £ F I S | | L £ R mog A B*ASN. *I5L£ADING, 
INFLAMMATORY AND UNJUDICIAL STATEMENT IN THE 
COURT ROOM, 
On July 2S ., 19«4» opening day of- the t la ] Il  il • • : • Ill J 1 
Ill ' ' ' ill : "( : 1) ' jur iit.t; uage f 44 tiler made the roilowing statement: 
* « « * - * > • • • » ' • . . . . . . :• ' •••>'• . ^ - M . w , . W . 
The Court: Ladles and Gentlemen, the Book OiW against the 
" i i deals with the legal profession in' Utah is there anyone here 
either more truthful than the populac 1 •• 1 • 1 it whole?" II 1 cm I eel LhaL 
||U|H
 f f » § III Ill Ill) I i j ! 1 11 ill 11 IIII III 111 IIIIII (Ill 
(Paute in preeeeaings). 
The'Court: I. e t tl 1 IIIIII • record show 1 1 ::i I lands are raised, 
(Whereupon, furthr {p iroceedlngr 1 1 1  IIIIII 11 ' IIIIII h a d bu K „ 1 i' ::: Ill: II 11 11 111 11 i ^  
EXH # 13 . The opinion expressed of uiha t the book Is . about it 1 
•iii i 1 1 lammatory * ' iitatement ::l 1 11 ,1 1  affront t :::i» till le attorneys and 
judges which were spoken well of In the book. The statement openly 
communicates a bias, defenslue attitude unbecoming and void of the 
judicial^:4emean^ to conduct a fair trial. That 
statement puts every prospective juror on the defensive to ujaiW&ld 
the integrity of an entity of his state and home, which he has pride 
in. Anyone who had read the book themselves, or who was even 
remotely acquainted with it, was excused from the panel. What 
remained were those only exposed to the biased opinion of an 
individual, who by his very title and position commands respect, 
whether deserving or not. Although the book was entered on the last 
day of trial, 
POINT IV 
JUDGE FISHIER VIOLATED THE DEFENDANT 
/APPELLANT'S PRIEST-PENITENT PRIVILEGE 
Judge Fishier violated this privilege*-on the basil a copy o 
the letter to Elder Ezra Taft Benson was sent to Charles C. Mann, 
who Judge Fishier states "was not a member of a recognized cl*rgyM. 
Charles C. Mann was a participant in the meeting in Elder Marion D. 
Hank;s office, referred to in the book and the letter. Charles C. 
Mann was at the ecclesiastical meeting going on between President 
Robert Barker and Blellep Kerry Heinz at the time of my phone call to 
Bishop Heinz (which meeting was taking place at the time of the call 
and the sam» meeting^ referred tp in the letter to Elder Benson. 
Charles C. Mann was at that meeting in an ecclesiastic capacity. 
Mr. Sherlock not being a member of the LDS faith and/or 
understanding his capacity at that meeting, no only couldn't explain 
it to the court, but couldnft understand it. However, it was proper 
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ecc les ias t ic /LDS Church procedure • f ci IIIII Ill iijllii mi IIIII Ill ::i • lb IIIII •• copied :: • i III i ,h i t 
pill i t ::l ii i t Ill lose two ai id mai ly a ill " tl in 
other meetings which took place regarding this matter. 
PLAINTIFF# WAYNE WADSWORTH GAVE PERJURED 
TESTIMONY ( T Til I •Ill 
Wayne Wadsworth has ma d IIIII IIIII s i g n i f i c a n t i s sue ji 111 , ( Il 1 1 1  i t 
Manns had a motivi il a • ii 1 laiill „ Mark Wheeler. Wayne Wadsworth said that 
the motive was to obtain the t rus t money oft tha David Newton Wheeler 
t 
trust money was the only motive that ex i s ted for art^iwi I1 shoot 
• • 
Mark Whoolor. *f i trial. tho following took placa.(Trial 
Q. { 5norlo; ) Do yotr>6call jkf oiCfor-bolng aado 
prior to tho trial In tho tru*t cat* Mm ftottlo thtft cast by 
4 
t corporate - trust** or a bank as a 
trustoo If Mr. MNtltr mould' aoroo to nowor attempt to 
broak tho trust and portonally cat a hold of tho aonoy? 
A. fMiipunii IWliiiiiiiiTiH ii j not. 
• - f* 7"-
« asktiat. f%f^ . : TrW that of for had boon aado, 11 mould hauo 
b*o% a«co#to# i*M* that . 
Ti - t o X l a o n y ^ M M oa»httlc 
qualification 
mambars 
torn** Hgtl Liaals and attarnay Hayna Wadsworth *r« both 
tha Sial* tar. lath wara awarn to taatlfy to tha truth. 
la* 
On* testimony has to be 
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1, ,h*ga always found 
Pa it] I :l a p i s t :: • lb • • i • honest and ethical i ag* ry datai 1. 
iNiiiii II (ii (ill (in i tgidanca that Wayna Wads worth hat littl i m • 
no regard for 'acts or truth, in "! i 111 transcript Pag* T 7 lin*s -20 
•posit ion which h%vt#ott in Ca l i fo rn ia . 
Th* testimon :l s patantly f a i t ' ii iiiiiii ( i ci lie i i owi it ill „ na Ilia ill iiiiiii ^  a Ilia f Wayna 
un«s tadsworth t*stifi*d that h# had i ii i il th* 
deposition taken of him. fll*flt * " that h* Wayna 
Hadswor^ M i d * a n * ttmtmmmn
 t ( i c a i all Ill ill t IIIIIII : 
Wayna Wads worth. Pag* 57 
of that aboue rmf*rr*4 t r d*p*sitio< i n * * 5 thru Il i i , Il , (Ik: f ill il i 
th* states 'ill ^ nt o r n i a and stat< > Il Il I Jill ^ Ill > ' ( Ill * g i t i « a t * l y 
inquired 1 nto at this Mini "" i1.**. was s aid as a statemant of fact 
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.„-.;&,£&; 
Paga 166. Uayna Wads worth sa 
Detective Thompson told him the Los Angelas Detectives left him so 
*r requests to follow through on. 
fpft On Page 379, - lines 10 thru 25 and Pa§a 380 - lines 1 thru \ 
Wayne Wadsworth testified Chief Deputy Sheehard already knew Stanlc 
C. Mann's num^/from tha Los Angeles detectives. 
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Testimony given by Wayne Wadsworth on various separate 




Mr. Wadsworth stated alleged facts 
Page .ines 6-17. 
MR. WADSWORTH: "Well, I'm sure that he honmWly believes 
that may be the case. But he doesn't Irnnway** background 
of the situation like sow of the re«t~of~ujBo7;r 
"And the reason I know something mK*»"» J^r*i because Mr. 
Wheeler is married to iv wife's. yo"u"noj^rslstsr. and I've 
been acgualnted. of course, with tjimmTevor since their 
marriage. 
"And I can assure the Court I h s t ^ B ^ f V * way I . not only 
w i l l there be no f inding thatThajWTs an unf\fr homo, there 
m i l l be a f inding that i t i s irvdJE** »«o percent i le of one 
or two percent of the hdmesj^uSnich a chi ld could be 
Placed." 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING IN. 
JANUARY 12, 1979. Mr. Wads worth. 
personal knowledge. 
Page 4ii Lines 22 thru 34 
it BRYANT CROFT'S COURT ROOM 
ited alleged) facts from his 
41 - t ines 1 thru 13 
MR. WADSWOtTW -^t-fJKow a l o t of references have been made to 
what counsel^Hean' t know about whore the chi ld is going 
and a l l o f ^ K t t . 1 know where ho is ooina Your Honor. 
]l ' M l llMmmPP" I I nrr±md to ** ***•'* 1 A t t l « s is te r . I 
h a o ^ s M P I I B h o i r h o m o mane times. I know the kind of 
I 'supI>-#>• ! I>i Wo have already, as I said; contacted 
th%r»JKn i * | r4»^ and he t e l l s us the ch i ld , being no older 
thaftmmfxr i *» i t w i l l remember. He says he doesn't know 
t a > | T j h i chi ld has had with the mother. I can 
tsJJP"' W9us#."-t1m the evidence is produced, she v is i ted 
' tua l ly every time Mr. wheeler v is i t ed wi th the c h i l d . " 
he was there. She bought him clothes. He has got toys 
r at her home tha t are s t i l l there. She bathed him, put him 
down for a nap, took care of him during the time—" 
19 
Page 16 - Lines 20 thru 25 Page 17 - Lines^T thru 16 
Q. Would i t be fa ir to say that the ciyJT tort cases you 
nav€Ti*Jor1red om a^nd* «auenf€ gone to trffcl would number in 
excess of 1,000? 
A. I guess it would. 
Q. When did you first becojfT inuolved, even if not 
employed, but contacted, invoked in something that led to 
representation of either **rKor Sylul Wheeler? 
A. Wall, the fir*tr ti»JJ*I was contacted was early one 
morning — - I think \Jjfm% probably the day following the 
day on which the alJpXane crash In which Jaaafwas killed 
occurred. 
Q. Mho taada tha^Rjfhtact? 
A. Mark. 
Q. I t was a ^fephone contact? 
A. Yes. 
Q. "H TfljfflTH* «*«* ***** ** *"•* **— * 
A. Yes. iTha* — a h f once or twice bafore that. 
Q.~ a»a»T*MMfrth* clrcu—tancaa of naur arlor —otlnqs with 
*** 
*v ana tl— I auess I re—bar the beet wav mv 
rtfo^r «Tda a* th» f W l » all ha* Chritfa* Eve dinner 
and that tort of thlna at our elaee one wear.' and I 
think, it I reaaetber right Mark and Svlui mere <Hifw 
^3ZT3P?X3E*^^-m u-wm'-ur 
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DEPOSITION TAKEN OF WAYNE WADSWORTH UNDER OATH BY 
UAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL AND MCCARTHY ON FEBRUARY 23, 1982 
Page 294 - Lines 4 thru 25. 
Q. You told me that the Wheelers had been in your^HDme on 
a couple of occasions before they ever retaijpc you in 
this matter. Haue you %^9r personally beeJSftn the 
Wheelers' home?-
Yes. 
Before the shooting? 
Yes, I'm sure. 
Just briefly, hom many occasij 
home, total of what period 
of %%*•** 
I think there haue been^ JUfr- I mas there once before 
They had once sh^gBV after they purchased their 
property in Northrjjpf and before the yard uias finithed 
and that sort of^fclnk. before they had a pool there or 
A. 
A, 
you i n the i r 
[me and ouer uihat period 
anything, I rt er being there once. It mould be on 
my wife and I mould be in the L. A. area, 
to Disneyland or something, uie mould 
occasions 
takina 
span* J^0[ay with than or something lika that. Then 
another tlwe that I totas thare aftar tha pool 
>leted. And I mas there at the time of the 
Fsltions that mere taken in the custody case. Then I 
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TESTIMONY GIUEN BY WAYNE WADSWORTtt ttNOtir^OATfr IN JUDGE PHILIP 
FISHLER'S COURT ROOM JULY 26, 1984. 
Pages 368, 369 & 370 (Lines 1 thru 12) 
Q. Prior to the hearing on the 11th of January, houi many 
times had you been in the Wheeler's home? 
A. Prior to the llth of January? 
Q. 1979? 
A. I don:t think I had been in their home prior to Januan 
llth. 
Q. of 1979? 
A. January of 1979. 
Q. How about January 12th? .Did you go there bajluoen the 
llth and the 12th? 
A. No. sure didn't. 
Q. Sir: on January 12th..'^m*. Ill frant of Judge Croft, yc 
made the following statement, didn't vou? "I know wher 
he^s going. Your Honor, because this man is married to 
my wife's little sister. I have been in their homa 
many times. I know the kind of people they are." You 
mad* that statement, didn't you? 
A. Yes, I was referring to Sylul Wheeler's home because, a 
I expressed earlier, she is the one that would be reall 
taking care of Dawid on a day-to-day basis, so I was 
referring to them. I'd been in her home she grew up i 
many, many times. I knew what kind of a person she was 
I knew what kind of a family she came from and I had 
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every confidonco that Dauid would be well taken care of 
in her home. 
That isn't what it says, though, is it? 
I think that's what it says. I just talked about Sylvi 
Wheeler and 1 said I'd been in their home. She had 
just very recently married Mark Wheeler. 
"I know where he's going. Your Honor, because this man 
is married to my wife's little sister. I have been in 
their homo many times. I know what kind of people they 
are.'1 Those are the words you said, are they not? 
Well, those are tho words I said and that's 
On tho 11th sir 
Mr. Christenson: Lot him finish his answer. 
The Court: Wore you finished, Mr. Madsworth? 
The Witness: I think so. Your Honors 
On tho llth you made tho following statement to the 
court, did you not:? "And tho reason I know something 
about it It because Mr. Wheeler is married to my wife's 
younger sister and I've boon acquainted, of course, with 
thorn O I M ^ ^ K O their marriage, and I can assure you 
that that's why I know - I know you will not bo hearing 
this, but not only will there be no finding that it's an 
unfit homo, thoro will bo a finding that it's in the top 
percentile of one or two percent of tho homos which the 
child can be placed.N Those are tho words you spoke, 
are they not, sir? 
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A. They are: and that's what I belleued. I'd be happy to 
have a child in Silvi Wheeler's home. 
Q. And vou had newer been in Svlvi and Mark Wheeler's horn 
Isn't that true? 
A. I think that it is true that I haue not been in their 
home after they had gotten married. 
Q. And it's also true that your client, the petitioner, 
the person you mere trying to get custody for, was not 
Sylui Wheeler; it was Mark Wheeler. Isn't that also 
true? 
A. That is true; and, as I told you, it was going to be 
Sylui that has to take care of him on a d«y-=4To-day 
basis. 
Wayne Wadsuiorth has committed perjury on a number o 
occasions for the purpose of implicating Louis* S. Mann and Stanle 
C. Mann in a vicious crime for which they were totally innocent an 
continue to commit perjury in order to cover up the vile acts he ha 
perpetrated. 
CONCLUSION 
I start^ to write the book OWE AGAINST THE STORM as 
personal tribute to my niece, Joan Newton Wheeler, so her son Davie 
would know of his mother's love and sacrifices for him and for other 
single parents and their children in similar circumstances. I never 
believed it would turn out as it did. I had no way of knowing Wayne 
Wadsworth and his FAMILY CLIENTS would perpetrate such vile acts to 
destroy both my wife and myself with such lies and accusations. 
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A lia doas not caasa to ba a lia lust because it Is said 
uihila in tha procass of advocacy. Evan though an attornay might 
claim immunity from suit, bacauss it was said In tha procass of 
advocacy doas, not taka away another's right to communicata to 
others, who hava raad that falsa statamant in tha papar or in a 
legal document, that: ifc**s falsa. 
Wayne Wadsworth's accusations against Louisa S. Mann, and 
Stanley c. Mann, in representing his Family Clients in tha cases 
referred to in tha book "QUE AGAINST THE STORtt" are falsa, I 
believe the constitutional right to so state they were falsa balongs 
to any citizen. By common used definitions, those accusations 
amount to lyirfg and perjury on the part of Wayne Wadsworth, whether 
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done in the process of advocacy or otherwise. 
Respectfully submitted. 
Stanley^C. Mann, pro se.. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that I delivered two copies of thi 
foregoing BRIEF OF THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT to: 
Ray Christensen. Esq. 
Christensen, Jensen and Powell 
900 Kearns Building 
Salt Dke City. Utah Btioi 
Lorin N. Pace, Esq. 
Pace, Klint. Wunderli 4 Parsons 
1200 University Club Building 
136 East juth TeAple 
Salt Lak- City. Utah §4111 
DATED this // day of ilJ»/S*y* . !»•« 
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